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Behavioral Economists at the Gate:
Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century
Maurice E. Stucke*

INTRODUCTION

The Law and Economics movement has been attacked from different
directions. Words such as "dead," "sick," and "peaked out" have
recently characterized its rational choice theories. 1 One assault has
come from economists who question these neoclassical economic
theories' unrealistic and simplifying assumptions about human nature.
Over the past few decades, behavioral economists have empirically
tested rational choice theory to assess the degree to which it accurately
predicts outcomes. 2 Under certain scenarios, rational choice theory gets
it wrong. The majority of individuals, for example, acted generously by
sharing a fair amount of money in contrast to the rational profitmaximizer's sharing only the nominal amount, a penny, or spitefully by
sacrificing money to punish unfair behavior whereas the rational profitmaximizer would reject the insult, and keep the money. At times, test
subjects performed better without financial incentives and behaved
worse with financial penalties. 3 Rational choice theory would predict
Maurice E. Stucke is an attorney at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not purport to reflect those of the
U.S. Department of Justice. The author would like to thank Harry E. Stucke and Albert A. Foer
for their helpful comments.
1. Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 303, 30304 (2005); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law & Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law & Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2000); Paul
Ormerod, Shun the RationalAgent to Rebuild Economics, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, at 17.
2. For interesting surveys of the many areas of research by the behavioral economists, see
Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics,
56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1666 n.7 (2003); Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law &
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1487 (1998). For a broader survey of literature attacking the
conventional economic theories, see ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH (2006). At
the recent annual meeting of the American Economic Association, the Nobel laureate George A.
Akerlof also questioned the assumptions of human behavior underlying neoclassical economic
theory, and called for a greater focus on actual human nature and the detailed facts of experience.
Louis Uchitelle, EncouragingMore Reality in Economics, N.Y. TtMES, Jan. 6, 2007, at Cl.
3. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Incentives, Punishment, and Behavior, in ADVANCES IN
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the opposite. This has led some to conclude from Amos Tversky and
Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman's behavioral economics research that
was at best grossly
"the rational choice model of human motivation
4
incomplete, and at worst, simply wrong."
While tossed against the rocks elsewhere, within the quiet waters of
antitrust these rational choice theories stand largely unchallenged.
Antitrust's economic theory, premised on "rational" (i.e., profit5
maximizing) behavior enjoys "the deep slumber of a decided opinion."
"Almost everyone professionally involved in antitrust today-whether
as litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed observers,"
observed Richard Posner, "not only agrees that the only goal of the
antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare, but also agrees
on the essential tenets of economic theory that should be used to
determine the consistency of specific business practices with that
goal."6 One uniformly accepted tenet, according to Posner, is that
business firms are profit-maximizers, so that "the issue in evaluating the
antitrust significance of a particular business practice should be whether
it is a means by which a rational profit maximizer can increase its
profits at the expense of efficiency." 7 In honoring Richard Posner and
Robert Bork, the Department of Justice acknowledged the Chicago
School's continuing influence on antitrust analysis. 8
Antitrust
economists continue to rely on Posner's and Bork's rational choice
theories premised on a hypothetical profit-maximizer. Likewise, the
federal courts regularly grant summary judgment if private plaintiffs'
theories do not make "economic sense," such as alleging economically

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 572, 573 (Camerer ed., 2004); Prentice, supra note 2, at 1751-52

n.463.
4. Charles R.P. Pouncy, The Rational Rogue: Neoclassical Economic Ideology in the
Regulation of the FinancialProfessional,26 VT. L. REV. 263, 302 (2002).
5. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 41 (Hackett Pub. Co. 1978).
6. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001). The basis for that assertion is not
attributed to any survey or other empirical research.
7.

Id.

8.

Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div. (Oct. 30, 2003), available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/October/03 at_596.htm (statement

by

R. Hewitt

Pate,

Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div.) ("Judge Posner's work has been critical to promoting

a sounder understanding of antitrust law. The Antitrust Division and antitrust practitioners
worldwide are tremendously grateful for the time and energy he has devoted to antitrust issues,

including his valuable writings, thoughtful analyses, and dedication to providing an intellectually
rigorous foundation for antitrust enforcement."); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust
Div.

(May

17,

2005),

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2005/

209051 .htm. (statement by R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div.) ("Judge
Bork has played a critical role in the advancement of sound antitrust enforcement, and it is a
privilege for the Division to recognize his outstanding antitrust career with this award.").
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irrational (non-profit-maximizing) behavior. 9 A Westlaw search did not
identify any federal court citing behavioral economics in any antitrust
decision.
Although behavioral law and economics has become "the hottest area
of legal scholarship,"' 10 few behavioral economics articles relate to, or
even discuss, antitrust. 1 1 Even some of the behavioral economics
literature assumes that the rational choice theories may be better suited
to predict corporate behavior in the marketplace, since irrational
companies (i.e., those that do not maximize profits) presumably are
driven out by their rational profit-maximizing competitors. 12
But companies are ultimately a collection of individuals. If the
public is an abstraction, 13 then how is the corporation (divorced from its
employees) any more definite? If many individuals systemically
deviate from rational choice theory's predicted outcomes under certain
scenarios, why shouldn't corporate behavior deviate under similar
scenarios? Companies reflect their employees. They can vary by
purpose (non-profit versus profit), structure (partnership, family
concern, conglomerate), national identity and cultural norms (local firm,
multinational), regulatory environment (utility versus unregulated
concern), and size (large versus small). A few dozen employees in a
small office, for example, may behave differently than a few hundred
9. Posner, among others, noted that summary judgment for the defendants is proper even if
there is some evidence of an antitrust violation, if plaintiffs theory of violation makes no
economic sense. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 614 (7th
Cir. 1997); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 467 (1992)
(summary judgment is appropriate where antitrust claim "simply makes no economic sense")
(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 594 n.19, 596-97
(1986)). On the other hand, courts have used such irrationality as evidence of a price-fixing
conspiracy. See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1044 (8th Cir.
2000) ("[A]cts that would be irrational or contrary to the defendant's economic interest if no
conspiracy existed, but which would be rational if the alleged agreement existed, do tend to
exclude the possibility of innocence.") (citing Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585
F.2d 877, 884 (8th Cir. 1978); Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1009-11 (6th
Cir. 1999); City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 570-71 & n.35 (11 th Cir.
1998)).
10. Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power & Efficiency of
CorporateLaw as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.581, 583 (2002).
11. As the President of the American Antitrust Institute commented, "I had to search for over
a year to find one student of behavioral economics who is paying special attention to antitrust."
Albert A. Foer, The Third Leg of the Antitrust Stool: What the Business Schools Have to Offer to
Antitrust, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 21, 33 (2003); see also Susan DeSanti, Antitrust in the
Information Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 565, 569 (2001) (noting Thaler's predictions suggest
ways in which economics may modify itself to enable better predictions of human behavior).
12. Jolls et al.,
supra note 2, at 1487; but see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1070-71.
13. Soren Kierkegaard, The Present Age, in THE LIVING THOUGHTS OF KJERKEGAARD 40-41
(W.H. Auden ed., 1952).
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employees in a large office in terms of free-riding. 14 Given companies'
heterogeneity, leveling to some mean (the average company) would
create a meaningless abstraction, like the term "public."
Antitrust analysis now stands at an exciting threshold. Spurred by the
findings of behavioral economics, antitrust policy makers should
critically assess their rational choice theories. In particular, the Federal
Trade Commission and Department of Justice should test empirically
the predictive value of their Horizontal Merger Guidelines, upon which
may substantially
they rely, to assess ex ante whether a potential merger
15
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
Merger policy plays a critical role in promoting open and competitive
markets. Each year, the federal antitrust agencies review over a
thousand mergers, of which only a small percentage are investigated,
and even a smaller percentage are challenged. 16 These mergers touch
upon billions of dollars in commerce involving all types of products and
services. Entrusted with the critical role of merger review, the federal
antitrust agencies, however, are still tinkering with dated economic
theory built upon unrealistic assumptions of human behavior. Unlike
the weather forecaster, the federal antitrust agencies today cannot state
with any empirical basis how often they and their dated economic
models actually got it right in predicting a merger's anticompetitiveness. Thus to better understand the real state of competition
in complex dynamic markets, one cannot simply ask what rational
profit-maximizers would do post-merger. Instead, one must determine
what actually happened post-merger. Despite the significant benefits
from such empirical testing, the main obstacle is complacency, namely
relying uncritically on the assumptions underlying rational choice
theory. The behavioral economics literature will eventually carry
antitrust into the twenty-first century. Enterprising antitrust lawyers in
Daubert motions, relying on the findings of behavioral economics, will
challenge these rational choice theories. But rather than being tugged

14. One study concerned the rate office workers paid for bagels under a honor system, by
leaving the amount owed in a box. The data showed that smaller offices with a few dozen
employees outpaid by 3 to 5 percent an office with a few hundred employees. STEVEN D. LEVITT
& STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 48-49 (2005); see also Ernst Fehr & Simon Gichter,
Reciprociy and Economics: The Economic Implications of Homo Reciprocans, 42 EUR. ECON.
REV. 845, 854-57 (1998).
15. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992,
revised 1997), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T[13,104 [hereinafter "Horizontal Merger
Guidelines"].
16. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., WORKLOAD STATISTICS FISCAL YEARS 19962005, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workstats.htm [hereinafter ANTITRUST DIV.
WORKLOAD STATISTICS].
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along, policy makers can significantly advance the current state of
antitrust law.
Part I of this article summarizes the contribution of behavioral
economics in testing predictions resulting from rational choice theory.
Part II describes the current grip of the Chicago School's rational choice
theories on the federal antitrust agencies and antitrust generally. PostChicago School antitrust theories have developed, but, while important,
have been limited in scope, and have had varying success in gaining
traction with the antitrust agencies. More importantly, the antitrust
literature to date has neither incorporated the findings from the
behavioral economics literature, nor has there been any unified
movement to reexamine the agencies' primary framework for reviewing
mergers, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
Borrowing from the behavioral economics literature, Part II.D
identifies some possible paradoxes and anomalies with respect to
antitrust's merger theories. It appears anecdotally that some corporate
behavior is (or is not) occurring that is not readily explainable under
antitrust's rational choice theories. Viewing the disjunction between
civil and criminal antitrust enforcement, it is an empirical question as to
the degree the federal antitrust agencies, relying upon their Merger
Guidelines, are indeed accurately forecasting the likely competitive
effects of mergers today.
Part III recommends specific legislation for improving the current
state of antitrust policy. In predicting whether a proposed merger may
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, the
federal agencies devote considerable resources investigating ex ante the
merger. But the agencies examine only half of the picture, namely the
state of competition in the few years leading up to the merger. Now it is
time for the agencies to systematically review what actually happens
post-merger. Close-call mergers would be revisited to determine if the
agencies got it right.
Part IV weighs the benefits and concerns of conducting such postmerger review.
Empirically validating or refining these antitrust
theories may reduce the likelihood of false negatives and positives in
merger review, lead to more effective antitrust enforcement, increase
transparency of the merger review process, make the agencies and their
officials more accountable for their decisions, and perhaps temper the
claims of partisanship in antitrust enforcement, which have increased
over the past quarter century.
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I. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS' CONTRIBUTION
A. What Is Rational?

Although no uniform definition has coalesced, rational choice theory
generally posits that people, either individually or collectively,
"maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate

an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of
markets." 17

The theory assumes that actors are rational, have

willpower, and will act in their own self-interest.
A threshold issue is the definition of rational. This is important
because labeling conduct as "rational" or "irrational" implicates
normative ideals. Posner, among others, equates rationality with
means-end reasoning, namely "choosing the best means to the chooser's

end." 18

Means-end reasoning is akin to the computer program,

Mapquest: one determines the most direct route to one's destination. In
defining rationality "as achieving one's ends ... at least cost,"19Posner
can conclude that rats are "at least as rational as human beings."
But rationality, as historically defined, went beyond such means-end
Foremost, rationality
reasoning, and reflected normative values.
Among the many
involved the choice of the end destination.

destinations (such as fame, fortune, or power), rationality was choosing
the proper end (such as happiness), which represented the highest and
20
most complete end, and the means of attaining that end (virtuous life).

17. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976).
18. Posner concedes this definition lacks precision and rigor. Richard A. Posner, Rational
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1551 (1998). Posner's
definition of rationality with respect to business firms incorporates, as this article later discusses,
the assumption of profit-maximization. POSNER, supra note 6, at ix.
19. Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 18, at 1551.
20. Aristotle, for example, viewed rationality to be the exercise of reason, which was in
accord with living a virtuous life. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK ONE (Martin
Oswald trans., 1962).
Thus, for Aristotle, rationality extended beyond best-means-toidiosyncratic-end determinations, but reflected deliberations on the end (happiness), and the
means to attain that end (virtuous life). Behavior motivated by wealth maximization was neither
rational, in accord with a virtuous life, nor likely to lead to happiness, but rather an appetite
devoid of rationality. Id. at 60-65. As the Archangel Michael said in JOHN MILTON, PARADISE
LOST, book xi, lines 530-34 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1935):
There is ... if thou well observe

The rule of Not too much, by temperance taught
In what thou eat'st and drink'st, seeking from thence
Due nourishment, not gluttonous delight,
Till many years over thy head return.
This maxim "not too much" was carved in Apollo's temple at Delphi alongside the inscription
"Know thyself." Id. at 439 (notes to Paradise Lost). See also PLUTARCH, ON SPARTA 150
(Richard S.A. Talbert trans., Penguin Books 1988) (Eighth-century Agiad King Alcamenes son of
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Rationality was more than the mental perception "to change and shift

with the greatest ease to what he shall himself judge desirable." 2 1 Our
duty was not simply in employing such means-end reasoning, but using
22
reason to improve ourselves, namely to create a "moral purpose."
Likewise, to the early economists means-end reasoning or utility

(wealth) maximization is not synonymous with rational behavior.
Adam Smith, for example, defined prudence as "[w]ise and judicious
conduct, when directed to greater and nobler purposes than the care of
the health, the fortune, the rank and reputation of the individual. 2 3

Prudence should be combined with "many greater and more splendid
virtues" such as "extensive and strong benevolence, with a sacred
regard to the rules of justice, and all these supported by a proper degree
of self-command. ' 24 Benevolence was not simply a normative ideal for
Smith; individuals acted, at times, out of goodness, even when they
25
derived nothing financially from it.
Some of the later economists, however, abandoned such normative
theories implicating moral values for the scientific aura of positive
economics. "It is not the province of the Political Economist to advise,"
stated David Ricardo. "He is to tell you how to become rich, but he is6
2
not to advise you to prefer riches to indolence, or indolence to riches."
Teleclus offered two rebuttals to today's profit-maximizer. When somebody asked how one
might best maintain the position of king, he said: "By not attaching undue importance to selfadvantage." When someone was remarking that he lived modestly although possessing adequate
means, he said: "Yes, for it is well that reason, not passion, should govern the life of a man who is
well-off."); SENECA, LETTERS FROM A STOIC 65 (Penguin ed. 2004).
21. PLUTARCH'S LIVES (Dryden trans., Arthur Hugh Clough ed. 1909).
22. Id. at 36-37.
23. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, part VI, section 1, line 15 (1759);
see also id. at VI.I.1. 1:
The man who acts according to the rules of perfect prudence, of strict justice, and of
proper benevolence, may be said to be perfectly virtuous. But the most perfect
knowledge of those rules will not alone enable him to act in this manner: his own
passions are very apt to mislead him; sometimes to drive him and sometimes to seduce
him to violate all the rules which he himself, in all his sober and cool hours, approves
of. The most perfect knowledge, if it is not supported by the most perfect selfcommand, will not always enable him to do his duty.
24. Id. at VI.1.15.
25. Id. at .. 1 ("How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles
in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to
him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.").
26. 2 DAVID RICARDO, THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 338 (Piero
Sraffa & M. H. Dobb eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1951-1973) (volume two of eleven volumes).
For an interesting overview of economics slippage from a moral philosophy to behavioral
science, see James E. Alvey, A Short History of Economics as a Moral Science, 2 J. MARKETS &
MORALITY (Spring 1999); see also Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral
Economics: Past, Present, Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3, 5-6 (Camerer
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What individuals believe they should do versus what they actually did
can diverge. Rather than opining on what individuals should do, these
economists sought to study actual human behavior, which more
accurately reveals individual preferences. By focusing on individuals'
actual choices, economists could improve their theories' predictive
value, thereby making their craft more scientific.
In divorcing rationality from normative ideals, these economists were
left to determine and articulate from the empirical data what causes
individuals to act across myriad situations. If from the myriad
manifestations of human behavior one could induce a general and
dominant characteristic of human behavior, then "neoclassical
economics can also be used to explain a wide array of nonmarket and
social phenomena." 27 The first assumption, and "[o]ne of the hallmarks
of rational decision making, is the notion that preferences, whatever
they may be, are stable." 28 If the majority of individuals' preferences
gyrated unpredictably, then predicting their behavior would be difficult.
Next, the economists must identify (preferably empirically) these stable
preferences. The Law and Economics movement has not uniformly
accepted what this stable preference is, and it can range from expected
utility, to self-interest, to wealth maximization. 29 With a vague stable
preference (such as utility maximization), the economic theory can
explain more easily behavior ex post (e.g., people acted in such manner
since it was the best means to maximize their utility). But the theory's
predictive value diminishes. 30 Similarly, in defining self-interest, for
example, to encompass everything from parsimony to benevolence, the
theory cannot accurately predict which
specific behavior (parsimony or
31
dominate.
likely
will
benevolence)
To bolster their theories' predictive abilities, certain economists
began incorporating assumptions that wealth motivates human behavior.
"The simple logic is that if humans are rational maximizers of their
wealth or self-interest in all their activities, they will respond to changes
in exogenous constraints, such as laws and sanctions, in a way that can

ed., 2004); BEINHOCKER, supra note 2, at 21-43.
27. Francesco Parisi, Introduction: The Legacy of Richard A. Posner and the Methodology of
Law and Economics, in THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE LAW xii (Francesco Parisi ed.,

2000).
28. Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, Neuroeconomics and Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1235, 1238 (2005).

29.

Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1060-67 (outlining spectrum of rational choice theory).

30.

Id. at 1061-66.

31.

Id. at 1065.
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be measured and predicted. ' 32 Thus many Chicago School adherents
adopted as the stable universal preference for their descriptive theories
(particularly those pertaining to business organizations) the
maximization of wealth and other personal material goals. 33 The

assumption is that people respond predictably and uniformly to financial
incentives and disincentives across myriad situations. Thus, for Robert
Bork and others, the profit-maximization assumption was "crucial" to
the Chicago School's rational choice theories. 34 This represented a
departure from the Harvard school, which Posner characterized as "so
fond of doing studies of competition in particular industries"; these
"microscopic examinations," to Posner "exemplified the particularistic
and non-theoretical character of the field." 35 In contrast, the Chicago
School's theory offered "powerful simplifications," such as "rationality,
profit maximization, the downward sloping demand curve." 36 It is also
37
easier on a superficial level to measure wealth than utility.
Today "[a]lmost all economic models assume that all people are
exclusively pursuing their material self-interest and do not care about
'social' goals per se." 3 8 As George Stigler wrote, when "self-interest
and ethical values with wide verbal allegiance are in conflict, much of
39
the time, most of the time in fact, self-interest theory ... will win."
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels agreed.4 °
32. Parisi, supra note 27, at xii.
33. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928
(1979) (discussing how each of the ideas of one of movement's founders, Aaron Director, was
deducible from his assumption that businessmen are rational profit-maximizers); Korobkin &
Ulen, supra note 1, at 1066.
34. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 119
(1978); see also 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW T 113, at
134 (2d ed. 2000) ("Business finms are (or must be assumed to be) profit maximizers"); George J.
Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964) ("[S]atisfactory theory of oligopoly
cannot begin with assumptions concerning the way in which each firm views its interdependence
with its rivals. If we adhere to the traditional theory of profit-maximizing enterprises, then
behavior is no longer something to be assumed but rather something to be deduced.").
35. Posner, supra note 33, at 931.
36. Id.
37. Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin & Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 243, 247 (1980) ("Partly because there is no common currency in which to compare
happiness, sharing, and protection of rights, it is unclear how to make the necessary trade-offs
among these things in the design of a social system. Wealth maximization makes the trade-offs
automatically."). For criticisms of this notion that wealth maximization does not suffer the same
infirmities of measurement as utilitarianism, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 521 (1980); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The
Lethal Effect of Wealth Maximization, 1999 WiS. L. REV. 687, 754-60.
38. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, in
ADVANCES INBEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 271, 271 (Camerer ed., 2004).
39. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gichter, Fairnessand Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, in
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But herein lies the trap. When rational choice theory's adherents (or
its detractors) characterize behavior as "irrational" because it deviates
from their theory's predicted outcome, then they have reverted from a

descriptive to a normative theory. They are not predicting how we
would act, but telling us how we ought to act.

This raises several

complications.
First, wealth maximization must be defended as an ideal that captures
all the relevant normative ideals important to society. 4 1 Perhaps

maximizing incentives for wealth accumulation will promote allocative
efficiency, which presumably will increase total welfare, which
presumably will generate the greatest amount of happiness, which
presumably will lead to the best of all possible worlds. Or perhaps not.
Economists would debate theologians, philosophers, political scientists,

and others in espousing how people either individually or collectively
ought to act, and should be prepared to answer what gives them greater

authority to proclaim that wealth maximization is an end itself, or the
principal means to some higher end, such as happiness. 42 Do we as a

society want to promote "self-interest seeking with guile [which]
includes . . . more blatant forms, such as lying, stealing, and cheating

ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 510, 510-11 (Camerer ed., 2004) (quoting George
Stigler, Economics or Ethics?, in TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALuES (S. McMurrin ed.,
1981)).
40. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in BASIC
WRITINGS ON POLITICS & PHILOSOPHY 9 (Lewis S. Feuer ed. 1959), arguing that the bourgeoisie:
has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural
superiors," and has left no other bond between man and man than naked self-interest,
than callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious
fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of Philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of
egotistical calculation.
41. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Models in Social Science: A Review of Law and Public Policy:
A Socioeconomic Approach by Lynne L. Dallas,41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 441, 442-43 (2004).
42. One normative view on monopolies is by the Roman Catholic Church, where "the motive
of the monopoly is, as a rule, not merely lacking in reasonableness, but positively unjust; for its
ultimate aim is not simply to acquire the patronage that now goes to its rivals, but in addition to
raise prices to the consumer after its rivals have been eliminated." NEW ADVENT ROMAN
CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/l0497b.htm
(discussing monopoly). Thus,
[w]hile monopoly is not necessarily unjust, and while any particular monopoly may be
free from unjust practices, experience shows that the power to commit injustice which
is included in monopoly cannot be unreservedly entrusted to the average human being
or group of human beings. Consequently, it is the duty of public authority to prevent
the existence of unnecessary monopolies, and to exercise such supervision over
necessary monopolies as to render impossible monopolistic injustice, whether against
the independent business man through unjust methods, or the consumer through unjust
prices.
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...[but] more often involves subtle forms of deceit"? 43 Is this our
moral purpose? Further, what are the moral boundaries of wealth
maximization theory?
A second complication is tyranny. Here, I deviate from some who
would foster government paternalism by rectifying individuals' socalled irrational behavior. Given that human nature is indeed mutable, a
great temptation exists to pressure so-called irrational (non-profitmaximizing) behavior until it conforms to the normative ideal of
rational (such as profit-maximizing) behavior. Often this is done with
noble intentions.
Sunstein and Thaler suggested a "libertarian
paternalism," whereby the government can maximize efficiency by
choosing an efficiency-enhancing default option, while allowing
citizens to opt out.4 4 But I am skeptical that this desire to correct human
behavior would be limited to these narrow instances. It is true that the
government, at times, bends the will of its citizens to attain a normative
self-contained ideal, such as justice or even efficiency. But efficiency,
like other normative ideals, is a matter of degree, and is rarely perfected.
Policy makers would follow the rational choice theorists into the fog in
determining: (i) how to achieve such conformity (by criminal or civil
law, financial incentives or disincentives, deception, or encouragement);
(ii) to what degree such deviant behavior must be altered to achieve the
minimum efficient scale; (iii) the incremental gain from such enhanced
efficiency; and (iv) the amount, to the extent quantifiable, these
incremental gains exceed the incremental costs to society (including the
impact on other normative ideals, such as the exercise of religious or
moral beliefs, freedom, self-governance, and justice). Moreover, what
moral values would underlie such paternalism? Some examples of
libertarian paternalism may engender little dispute (such as creating as
the default option organ donation as many European nations' "presumed
consent" policies do). 45 But what if the default rules comport with a
deterministic view of individuals as self-centered liars, thieves, and

43. Fehr & Gachter, supra note 39, at 510 (quoting OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985)). Indeed one series of experiments found that subconscious
reminders of money prompted those studied to become more independent in their work, less
likely to seek help from others or to provide it, more reluctant to volunteer their time, and stingy
when asked to donate to a worthy cause. Benedict Carey, Just Thinking About Money Can Turn
the Mind Stingy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at F6. For other morality-based criticisms of Law
and Economics, see Prentice, supra note 2, at 1671 n.27. For a discussion of the morality of
antitrust violations, see Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COL. BUS. L. REV. 443
(2007).
44. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron,
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper No. 03-2, 1-2 (April 2003).
45. Id. at 39-40.
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cheaters (such as presuming that gifts to charities were made in material
self-interest, unless the contributor can establish, by a preponderance of
evidence, the contrary)? Moreover, if few humans opt out of the default
option, is it possible to steer behavior toward a life with little purpose
other than wealth maximization?
Finally, this dilemma cannot be easily circumvented by
distinguishing between private and governmental measures, as that line
is rarely clear. The rational choice theorists may wave off the notion of
bending the private citizens' will as a condition precedent for attaining
minimum efficient scale; market forces will reward the profitmaximizers, and punish the non-maximizers. But for that to happen, the
government cannot inhibit such market forces (such as through high
trade tariffs or overzealous antitrust enforcement). But this argument
assumes that market forces preexist (and exist independently of)
government and institutional norms. It would be foolish to look solely
at the behavior of the market actors, as though they were unaffected by
the industry's legal and ethical norms. As R.H. Coase noted, the stock
market, the example often used of perfect or near-perfect competition, is
heavily regulated.4 6 At times, government regulation creates the market
itself (such as the market for pollution rights) 4 7 or is necessary for its
development, such as laws to define, protect, and transfer property
rights, to promote banking systems and savings, to encourage
cooperative efficiency-generating arrangements (such as contract
law). 4 8 Although some may characterize the antitrust laws as an
exogenous force to be used sparingly in a free-market system, the
competition laws are no different than many other areas of contract and
property law. They seek to promote some types of cooperation that
promotes overall welfare (such as non-zero-sum games, whereby joint

46. R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 713, 718
(1992).
47. Among the emission trading systems are the SO 2 trading system under the "Acid Rain
Program" framework created by the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. See EPA Acid Rain
Program Allowance Auctions Fact Sheet, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/auctions/factsheet.html;
see also Illinois's Emissions Reduction Market System, http://www.epa.state.il.us/air/erms/
overview.htmi (highlighting a trading program for volatile organic compounds in the Chicago
area); European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme, http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/climat/emission.htm (in which all twenty-five member states of the European Union
participate).
48. BEINHOCKER, supra note 2, at 261 (discussing William Easterly & Ross Levine, Tropics,
Germs & Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development, National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 9106 (2002)) ("The rule of law, the existence of property
rights, a well-organized banking system, economic transparency, a lack of corruption, and other
social and institutional factors played a far greater role in determining national economic success
than did any other category of factors.").

2007]

Behavioral Economists at the Gate

venturers pool resources and labor to develop new products or
technologies), while deterring cooperation that harms welfare (such as
zero-sum games, whereby competitors collude to fix prices and transfer
wealth from the consumer to themselves). 49 Absent the evolution of the
rule of law and other social technologies, the free market would be
fairly primitive: with club in hand, we would be guarding our caves,
until someone cleverer or stronger displaced us.
Thus, antitrust policy makers must navigate between the Scylla of
neoclassical economic theory with its faith in market forces and
Charybdis of socialism with its faith in government forces. They must
accept market and government forces as necessarily interrelated, but
must not steer too close to either hazard. Because the "legal system will
have a profound effect on the working of the economic system and may
in certain respects be said to control it," 50 distinguishing between
efficiency-enhancing and inefficient government actions may be
difficult. Further, it may not always be clear when a regulation would
51
assist "irrational" agents while doing little harm to rational agents.
Two caveats are in order. Economists are not precluded from
normative theories generally. Discussions on the appropriate rate of
inflation, subsidies to different interest groups, or rules on insider
trading may all implicate normative ideals. Indeed, as Sunstein and
Thaler recognize, such paternalism is unavoidable when policy makers
determine many default options, such as the basic state insurance
52
program for motorists.
Second, economics need not be in opposition to theologians,
philosophers, or political scientists.
For example, a nation's
productivity may be positively correlated with attributes of a moral
society, 5 3 and indeed Aristotle recognized that a minimum amount of
wealth would help in attaining happiness. A more constructive role for
economists is to help develop norms to foster welfare enhancing
cooperative behavior. Life need not be a zero-sum game, where we
suspect that others' advancement comes at our expense. As Benjamin
Friedman nicely chronicles, whenever America was mired in economic

49. Id. at 274.
50. Coase, supra note 46, at 717-18.
51. But see Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 26, at 36 ("[A] regulation should be
irresistible if it can help some irrational agents, and does little harm to rational ones.").
52. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 44, at 17, 40 (noting state's choice of default option [either
low premiunm/no-rght-to-sue versus high premium/right-to-sue] has significant impact on most
motorists' ultimate choice).
53. See BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 108-

09 (2005).
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immigrants, the poor, and other competing groups (whether by
nationality, religion, race, or gender) increased as these groups were
seemingly threatened by others stealing their fixed (or dwindling) share
of the pie. In contrast, during periods of economic growth, our society
slowly shed this zero-sum mentality, and progressed toward openness,
mobility, and democracy. 54 Thus, to gauge America's economic health,
one could look at our nation's borders: are we building walls or
factories?
Consequently, rational choice theorists (or behavioral economists for
that matter) navigate rougher waters when characterizing actual
behavior as "irrational," as they are implicitly opining on a normative
ideal of rationality that includes wealth maximization as a stable
Given that rational choice theory long ago
uniform preference.
abandoned any pretensions of being a normative theory (such as telling
people how they ought to act to obtain happiness), the Law and
Economics' remaining currency is as a descriptive theory (accurately
explaining why many people act the way they do, and in predicting how
they likely will act when responding to various financial incentives or
disincentives). 55 The legitimacy of any descriptive theory rests neither
in its simplicity nor its elegance, but rather in the quality of its
predictions.56 And it is here that the behavioral economists have played
an important role.

54. Id. at 79-102. Friedman identifies several historical time periods where society, in
response to economic growth, moved toward greater openness, tolerance, mobility, fairness, and
democracy: (i) the Horatio Alger era (1865-80); (ii) the Progressive era (1895-1919); (iii) the
Civil Rights era (1945-73); and (iv) tentatively the New beginnings (1993 onward, which early
on had widely distributed rising incomes, but is questionable today). Id. at 105-215. In contrast,
American society moved away from these Enlightenment ideals in response to periods of
economic stagnation, such as the (i) Populist era (1880-95); (ii) Klan era (1920-29); and (iii)
Backlash era (1973-93). Id. The one great exception, as Friedman describes, was the New Deal
era (1929-39). Not only did this economic disaster have an extraordinarily widespread impact,
but "the socially corrosive power of a more ordinary economic distress [was] overwhelmed by
still stronger forces of a different kind if the distress [was] so great as to constitute an out-and-out
crisis." Id. at 178. If America can no longer sustain its rising standard of living for its citizens,
then our democratic ideals are under greater risk as we move toward a zero-sum game mentality.
As Friedman concludes, "Only with sustained economic growth, and the sense of confident
progress that follows from the advance of living standards for most of its citizens, can even a
great nation find the energy, the wherewithal, and most importantly the human attitudes that
together sustain an open, tolerant, and democratic society." Id. at 436.
55. BORK, supra note 34, at 120 (validity of Chicago School's tenets "depends upon their
success in predicting behavior").
56. MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS INPOSITIVE ECONOMICS 14-16 (1953).
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B. Lessons from BehavioralEconomics

Behavioral economists note that individuals do not always act in
ways the rational choice theories predict. Drawing from the findings of
other disciplines, such as psychology, neuroscience, and sociology,
behavioral economists note that a sizeable percentage of their test
subjects systemically deviate from these rational choice theories'
predicted outcome in several important ways: (1) bounded rationality;
57
(2) bounded willpower; and (3) bounded self-interest.
Bounded rationality refers to the fact that humans are not
microprocessors, and often do not engage in the multilevel strategies
envisioned under certain rational-choice game theories. 58 If we did, we
would rarely, if ever, play chess: the outcome, in any game with set
rules and a finite number of sequential moves, could be determined by
the initial move. 59 Individuals, the behavioral economists conclude,

generally rely on rules of thumb (heuristics) in making decisions 60 and
engage in a couple of steps of iterated reasoning. 6 1 A few of the many
anomalies observed are:
loss aversion (namely having significantly greater concern about
62
losing a given amount than in the utility of gaining the same amount);
the endowment effect (when we demand much more to give up and
sell an object than what we would be willing to pay to acquire that
object) ;63
57. See Prentice, supra note 2, at 1664 n. 1 (2003) (citing law articles regarding behavioral law
and economics concepts).
58. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449-75 (2003).
59. AVINASH DIXIT & BARRY NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY 41-44 (1991). Indeed,
E. Zermelo formulated in the early twentieth century an algorithm that leads to an equilibrium
outcome in chess, but nonetheless, grandmasters still compete today. MARTIN J. OSBORNE &
ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 6 (1994).
60. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 3 (Kahneman et al.,
eds., 1982).
61. For example, most test subjects in the "p-beauty contest game" engaged in only one or two
steps of iterated reasoning. See Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 26, at 30.
62. RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 70-74 (1992). Loss aversion forms part of Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect
Theory, whereby people are risk averse over gains, and risk seeking over losses, and the way an
issue is framed (as a gain or avoiding a loss) will affect the individual's choice. Nicholas
Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE 16-21 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005).
63. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE, supra note 62, at 63; Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1482,
1484, 1498; Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1327 tbl.1 (1990)
(summarizing studies).
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status quo bias (when the choice of default option impacts the
outcome);

64

as a sure gain or
framing effects (the way the choice is framed-such
65

avoiding a loss-alters the way we decide);

availability heuristic (when we assess the probability of an event by
asking whether relevant examples come readily to mind);66
representative heuristic (when we ignore the "base rates and
overestimate the correlation between what something appears to be and
67
what something actually is");

overconfidence bias (when we believe that good things are more
likely (and bad things less likely) than average to happen to us); 68 and
hindsight bias (our tendency to overestimate the ex ante prediction
that we had concerning the likelihood of an event's occurrence after
69
learning that it actually did occur).
Bounded willpower refers to when we knowingly act contrary to our

economic interests. Some of us engage in actions known to be
detrimental (such as smoking or overconsumption), and thus may incur
additional costs given that our willpower is weak, (such as opting for
automatic payroll deductions into assets with liquidity restrictions to
constrain our immediate consumption) 70 or paying more for less of what
we like too much (such as buying cigarettes individually or by the pack
rather than by the carton).7 1 We may also behave in ways contrary to
64.

THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE, supra note 62, at 68-70.
65. For example, framing the choice as number of lives a policy option will likely save versus
framing it as to the number of people who will die, leads to different results. Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, SCIENCE 211, 45358 (1981).
66. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Market Efficiency and Rationality: The Peculiar
Case of Baseball, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1390, 1395-96 (2004) (book review) (noting study that
individuals are more likely to think that more words on a random page end with "-ing" than have
the letter n as their next to last letter). Individuals may also conclude that the probability of any
event (such as a car accident) is greater if they have recently witnessed such an event than if they
have not. Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1477.
67. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1086 (citing Tversky and Kahneman's bank teller
problem).
68. Id. at 1091-95. Of the 1,033 randomly selected adults surveyed by the Washington Post
telephone poll between November 4-8, 2005, ninety-four percent said they are at least slightly
above average in terms of honesty/trustworthiness, eighty-nine percent said they were above
average in terms of common sense, eighty-eight percent in terms of friendliness, eighty-six
percent in terms of intelligence, seventy-nine percent in terms of physical appearance, and sixtynine percent in terms of health. We're All Above Average, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2006, at A2.
69. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1,at 1095-1100.
70. Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 26, at 24.
71. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS

75, 90 (Camerer ed., 2004).
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the tenets of wealth maximization (such as giving the U.S. government
an interest-free loan by withholding too much taxes from our paycheck
to ensure a return at tax time).7 2
Bounded self-interest involves an interesting confluence between
descriptive economic theories and ethical norms. Individuals may
aspire toward benevolence in accordance with some religious or social
norm of fairness even though such behavior deviates from the tenets of
wealth maximization. Rational choice theory predicts that our dominant
strategy will be to free ride when confronted with a public good. But
behavioral economists note that many test subjects often do not free ride
at all (or not to the extent predicted under rational choice theory). 7 3 In
these public good experiments, "people have a tendency to cooperate
until experience shows that those with whom they're interacting are
taking advantage of them." 7 4 Individuals at times act benevolently even
when not in their financial interest. Thus, behavioral economists ask,
why do many individuals, contrary to rational choice theory, tip waiters
and waitresses in cities they are unlikely to revisit? 75 Why do
individuals donate blood? 76 Why do individuals abide with the "honor
system" at various locales by leaving the suggested amount in the
offering box? 7 7 Conversely, individuals may sacrifice monetary gains to
punish those they feel are acting unfairly, i.e., deviating from an
established reference point of what is fair. One frequently cited
experiment of negatively reciprocal behavior 7 8 and bounded selfinterest is the "Ultimatum Game." Suppose you are given $100 on the
condition that you share some portion of that $100 with another person
(suppose an anonymous person in a cubicle in the adjoining building).
If the other person accepts your offer, you can keep the balance. If,

72. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE, supra note 62, at 93; Jolls et al., supra note 2,at 1479.
73. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE, supra note 62, at 9-20; Prentice, supra note 2,at 167576.
74. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE, supra note 62, at 14.
75. In one study, the mean response by those surveyed of the tip they would leave in a
restaurant they frequent regularly or in another city which they do not expect to revisit was nearly
identical ($1.28 versus $1.27 for a $10 meal). Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H.
Thaler, Fairnessas a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 728, 737 (1986). Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 252, 264 (Camerer ed.,
2004).
76. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 3, at 573.
77. See LEV1r & DUBNER, supra note 14, at 45-51 (discussing the honesty of office workers
in paying for bagels under an honor system).

78. Reciprocity is reciprocating fair behavior with fairness (positive reciprocity) and
punishing unfair action with punitive action. Fehr & Gdchter, supra note 14, at 510-11.
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offer, then both of you get
however, the other person rejects your
79
offer?
you
should
much
How
nothing.

Individuals, as the behavioral economic research concludes, generally
care about treating others, and being treated, fairly. 80 Unfairness,
namely the deviation from some generally accepted normative ideal,
may have economic implications. 8 1 Contrary to rational choice theory,
which assumes one predicted response (offer the nominal amount in the
Ultimatum Game), the response may vary depending on the deviation, if
any, from the normative reference point of what is fair. Offer a fair
amount, and both players win in the Ultimatum Game. Offer an unfair

amount (e.g., the profit-maximizer's penny), and you will not maximize
your wealth. Change the reference point of fairness, and the results may
vary. Assume now that the $100, in the above Ultimatum Game

scenario, was given to you as an entitlement (such as for running around
the track four times under 9 minutes), and the anonymous person from
their warm cubicle could see you huffing around the icy track. Would
you expect your counterpart to agree to a different split (perhaps
$75:$25 or $80:$20)? Alternatively, what if you could sympathetically
evoke a greater utility for that money (for example, being unemployed,
with no health insurance, and having a baby with a fever)? If that was
communicated, might that likely generate a different payment split?
Aside from reciprocity, individuals at times may act from an intrinsic
motivation, independent of any financial reward. 82 Indeed, a financial

reward at times may decrease (rather than increase) motivation or the
likelihood of the desired results. For example, Uri Gneezy and Aldo
Rustichini conducted an interesting study with high school test subjects
79. Rational choice theory predicts that your offer should be the smallest monetary amount
above zero (e.g., one penny), and the recipient should accept any positive offer. Actual studies in
more than twenty countries show the contrary: the majority of individuals offer significantly more
than the nominal amount (ordinarily forty to fifty percent of total amount available) and recipients
typically (about half the time) reject nominal positive amounts (less than twenty percent of the
total amount available). Id. at 512; Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 26, at 27; THALER, THE
WINNER'S CURSE, supra note 62, at 21-35; Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1489-93; Werner Guth,
Rolf Schmittberger & Bernard Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3
J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 371-74, 375 tbls. 4 & 5 (1982); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L.
Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285,
S291 tbl.2 (1986). One study found that male behavior in the ultimatum game is systematically
linked with testosterone levels. Males who reject unfair offers have higher testosterone levels
than males who accept unfair offers. Fehr & Gdchter, supra note 14, at 513 (summarizing John
F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Testosterone and Negotiations,
submitted by Terrence Burnham (1999)).
80. Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1494; Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness Into Game
Theory and Economics, 83 AM. EcON. REv. 1281, 1282 (1993).
81. Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1496 ; Kahneman et al., supra note 75, at 728-29.
82. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 3, at 574-75.
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who collected donations for a public purpose in Israel's annually
publicized "donation days." 83 One group of high schoolers was given a
pep talk of the importance of these donations. A second group, in
addition to the pep talk, was promised 1% of the amount collected (to
be paid from an independent source). A third group was promised an
even greater financial incentive (10% of the amount collected). Under
rational choice theory, the third group, motivated by the greater
financial incentive, should collect the most donations. Instead, the
groups promised the 1% and 10% shares collected a lower average
amount ($153.67 and $219.33, respectively) than the group not
financially compensated but given only the pep talk ($238.60).84
Besides examining financial incentives, these authors studied whether
financial disincentives curb the unwanted behavior. 85 Their study
examined what impact, if any, a monetary fine had on curbing undesired
behavior (namely parents who picked up their children late from certain
private day-care centers). These private day-care centers originally had
no rule governing parents who picked up their children after 4:00 P.M.;
generally, a teacher had to wait with the tardy parent's child. A fine on
tardiness was thereafter introduced in some of the day-care centers,
which, under rational choice theory, should decrease the incidences of
tardiness. Instead, the average number of late-arriving parents increased
for these day-care centers. Moreover, after the fine was canceled, the
average number of late-arriving parents did not return to the pre-fine
levels. For the control group, on the other hand, where no fine was
imposed, there was no significant shift of late-arriving parents during
this period, and fewer parents reported late in these day-care centers
than in the day-care centers with the fine. So why did the monetary
penalty increase the undesired behavior? Perhaps, as the authors
conclude, parents before were intrinsically motivated to pick up their
children on time. The introduction of the fine monetized that lateness
86
into an additional service, offered at a relatively low price.

83. Id.
84. Id. at 578-80.

85. Id. at 581-86.
86. Id. Another study involving citizens preparing their income tax statements attempted to
determine the effect of sanction threats and to compare them with appeals to conscience. Richard
D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 274, 283-99 (1967). For
the "sanction-treated" group, the emphasis was on the severity of possible jail sentences and the
likelihood that tax violators would be apprehended. The "conscience" group was exposed to

questions "accentuating moral reasons for compliance with tax law." Id. at 286-87. The
conscience appeal, overall, had a stronger effect on income reported than did the threat of
sanctions. The study's results gave some evidence that although the threat of punishment can
increase compliance (particularly among the wealthiest respondents), appeals to conscience
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Behavioral economics has not escaped criticism. 87 But it cannot be
seriously disputed that empirically testing rational choice theory's
predictive value, and its simplistic (and some may say unflattering)
assumptions on human behavior, has beneficial value.
More
importantly, it is not in destroying rational choice theory that behavioral
economists should find ease to their relentless thoughts. Rather the
behavioral economists should let rational choice theory's remaining
embers dissipate, and turn instead to more interesting challenges:
namely, (i) building upon Kahneman and Tversky's findings on
heuristics and biases by empirically studying and testing actual behavior
across different settings; (ii) incorporating into economic theory more
realistic assumptions of human behavior; and (iii) refining current, or
developing new, descriptive economic theories that explain (and are
consistent with) the empirical data and, if possible, offering testable and
88
accurate predictions.
C. Theory of the Firm
One frontier for behavioral economists generally, and antitrust
scholars specifically, is to understand how people respond across social
settings, including behavior within the firm. As Coase noted, many
economists have displayed little interest studying such corporate
behavior. 89 The Chicago School's rational choice theories, for example,
do not delve into what happens within the firm, or why firms act the
way they do. Instead, their theories "through the lens of price theory,"

(particularly among the college-educated respondents) can be a more effective instrument than
sanction threat for securing compliance. Id. at 299. See also Greenfield, supra note 10, at 61517 (noting that perceptions of fairness and justice may in certain situations play a greater role in
motivating behavior than incentives or penalties); Stucke, supra note 43 (discussing shortcomings

of optimal deterrence theory in generally deterring antitrust crimes and suggesting moral norms,
peer pressure, shaming, and praise as supplements to deter antitrust crimes).
87.

Posner's criticisms of the behavioral economics literature include: (i) that it is derivative,

and not a descriptive theory itself (namely it explains what rational choice theory cannot); (ii) the
representativeness of the test subjects (some studies rely on university students); (iii) the test
conditions (that results, based on test subjects' responses to either hypothetical questions or where

the financial stakes were nominal, are divorced from real market conditions); and (iv)
paternalism. Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 18, at 1370, 1559-60, 1565, 1575. For other
articles critical of behavioral economics, see Prentice, supra note 2, at 1668-69 n. 1, 1753-54

(citing articles).
88.

THALER, WINNER'S CURSE, supra note 62, at 167; Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note

26, at 7.
89. Inhis lecture delivered in Stockholm when receiving the Nobel Prize, Coase complained
of "blackboard economics": "What is studied is a system which lives in the minds of economists
but not on earth. . . .The firm and the market appear by name but they lack any substance."
Coase, supra note 46, at 714.
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assume that companies behave as would their theoretical profit9
maximizing counterparts. 0
At an initial glance, rational choice theory appears well-suited to
predict corporate behavior. Even if many individuals systemically
deviate from rational choice theory's predicted outcome in some
settings, it does not automatically follow that the same individuals
would deviate in other settings governed by different legal obligations
and social expectations. Publicly held corporations, unlike college

students responding to hypotheticals, owe a legal obligation to
maximize their shareholders' interests. 9 1 All companies must maximize
profits to thrive (and ultimately survive); otherwise profit-maximizing
92
competitors or new entrants will eliminate them from marketplace.
Thus, one should expect corporate employees to act differently, just as
parents may employ different strategies playing the game Monopoly at
93
home against their children than at work against their competitors.
But there are several reasons why one should not rely uncritically on
rational choice theory in the corporate setting. First, popular business
literature recognizes the heterogeneity and emotionality of employees'
behavior, which is not driven solely by corporate imperatives but also
by the employees' own values. 94 Even if profit-maximization were the
90. Posner, Chicago School, supra note 33, at 932-34; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at

1066 ("Nearly all law-and-economics literature on business organizations, following the
neoclassical economic theory of firms, is built on the explicit or implicit assumption that firms
seek to maximize profits.").
91. Greenfield, supra note 10, at 605 (citing case law).
92. In United States v. Syufy Enterprises, Judge Kozinski noted that it is the "nature of free
enterprise that fierce, no holds barred competition will drive out the least effective participants in
the market, providing the most efficient allocation of productive resources." United States v.
Syufy Enter., 903 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1990).
93. Some have further distinguished between experimental and behavioral economics, noting
that a key insight from experimental economics, and that "which separates it from behavioral
economics, is the notion that the behavior of individuals in a group may not simply be
reductionistically determinable from individual behavior." Terrence Chorvat et al., Law and
Neuroeconomics, GEORGE MASON LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER NO. 04-07 11 (2005).

Although some behavioral economists, who research behavior within a firm, may question this
distinction, few would dispute that individual behavior can change across social settings, and
what behavior may be permissible in one setting (pushing to get a seat on a New York City
subway) may not be permissible in another setting (pushing for an available seat in a church
pew).
94.

Norman W. Hawker, Antitrust Insights from Strategic Management, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L.

REv. 67, 74 (2003) (few strategic management text books cite profit-maximization as theory of
the firm); see, e.g., LANCE A. BERGER ET AL., THE CHANGE MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 129-30

(1994) (company's mission statement to its employees predicated solely on a commercial profitmaximization rational ("do it this way because it will make us commercially successful") is
unlikely to be effective, these business authors argue. Rather, rationale for desired corporate
behavior should contain an ethical rationale ("do it this way because it is the right way")); PETER
BLOCK, THE EMPOWERED MANAGER 85-104 (1987) (discussing an enlightened self-interest).
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shared goal, the means are varied and not necessarily hierarchal.
Consequently, if corporate (and thus management and employee)
behavior were as predictable as rational choice theory posits, there
would be little demand (and thus nominal supply) for managerial
organizational behavior courses, management consultants, or popular
corporate self-help books.
Second, the Chicago School's theories were never conceived
inductively through rigorous empirical testing. As Posner admitted, "It
is a curiosity, and a source of regret, that to this day [1979] very few of
[one of the movement's founders Aaron] Director's ideas have been
subjected to systematic empirical examination." 9 5 Instead, their rational
choice theories were derived deductively from the hypothetical of a
perfectly competitive market, which assumes transparent prices, highly
elastic demand curves, easy entry and exit, and informed profitmaximizing producers and consumers. Price will equal marginal cost,
and the market will produce the efficient level of outputs with the most
efficient techniques and using the minimum quantity of inputs. 96 It is
questionable whether such perfectly competitive markets in a stable
equilibrium actually exist.
Third, rational choice theories have not fared well in explaining
industries that approach the perfectly competitive ideal. Neoclassical
economists often use the stock market as the example that most closely
approximates perfect competition. 9 7 The Efficient Market Hypothesis
posits that stock prices reflect their fundamental value (the discounted
sum of expected future cash flow). 9 8 The Efficient Market Hypothesis,
like rational choice theory generally, assumes that rational profitmaximizing traders through arbitrage will minimize the influence of
irrational noise traders, and exploit temporary arbitrage opportunities to
restore prices to their fundamental value. But as Lynn Stout and other
scholars have written, the Efficient Market Hypothesis has fallen into
disrepute. 99 The burgeoning behavioral finance literature questions the
degree of efficiency in the stock market and addresses the limits of such
arbitrage.' 0 0 Thus, if irrationality is not driven out of supposedly
95. Posner, Chicago School, supra note 33, at 931 n. 13.
96. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 106-41 (15th ed. 1995).
97. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, at 164.
98. Barberis & Thaler, supra note 62, at 3.
99. See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003). See, e.g., 2 ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard
H. Thaler ed., 2005); ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2001). See also Prentice,
supra note 2, at 1704-05 nn.208-11 (citing additional articles).
100. Barberis & Thaler, supra note 62, at 2 (limitations on arbitrage one of two building
blocks of behavioral finance); BEINHOCKER, supra note 2, at 175-85, 381-403.
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perfectly competitive markets, why should we assume that irrationality

is driven out in less efficient markets?
Not surprisingly, irrational (non-profit-maximizing) behavior, not
readily explainable under rational choice theory, is found in other
markets. 10 1 One example is professional baseball. For decades,
America's pastime compiled detailed data measuring many facets of
player productivity. Few other occupations can measure their workers'
productivity in such detail and with such transparency for all
participants to analyze. 10 2 With the advent of free agency, one would
expect, given the financial stakes, that different profit-maximizing
baseball teams would appropriately value a player's worth based on
such productivity information. Instead, the Oakland Athletics, despite
having one of the smaller payrolls, fielded very competitive teams by
exploiting the baseball market's inefficiencies. 10 3 It remains an

empirical question then of how quickly agents of change (such as
entrants, bankruptcy, mergers and hostile takeovers, new management,

or shareholder revolt) drive out non-profit-maximizing behavior in
various markets, each presumably operating at different degrees of
efficiency. 104 The authors of one New York Times bestseller opined that
many American companies are "bloated, clumsy, rigid, sluggish,
noncompetitive, uncreative, inefficient, disdainful of customer needs,
and losing money."' 1 5 Although these dire generalizations should be
questioned, sufficient demand obviously exists for these management
consultants' predictions and elixirs.

101. Such anomalies include interindustry wage differentials and horse-race betting. THALER,
WINNER'S CURSE, supra note 62, at 36-49, 132-38. It was found after the introduction of the
Euro currency in the European Union. Under traditional economic theory, the dropping of trade
barriers, increased mobility of people, reduction in currency costs, and greater price transparency
should lead to greater convergence of prices across the EU. Instead the standard deviation of
prices within the Euro zone rose from 12.3% in 1998 to 13.8% in 2003. BEINHOCKER, supra note
2, at 61-62.
102. MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME 28-42 (2003)
(discussing how a player is evaluated by scouts). See also Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 66, at
1392-93 (discussing the many ways in which players are evaluated). It is true that while the data
were transparent (moreover, one can watch the players' performances on television in the modem
era), the statistics compiled from the data were, at times, incomplete (excluding walks from
batting average, thus prompting a new statistic, on-base percentage) or a poor indicator
(subjective decision of an "error," which does not accurately measure players' defensive skills).
103. LEWIS, MONEYBALL, supra note 102, at xii-xv; see also Thaler & Sunstein, supra note
66, at 1394-95.
104. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1071; Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A
Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other
Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 104 (1997).
105. MICHAEL HAMMER & JAMES CHAMPY, REENGINEERING THE CORPORATION: A
MANIFESTO FOR BUSINESS REVOLUTION 7 (1993).
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Consequently, as Coase argued, more empirical work is needed on
intra-firm behavior, commonly described as the "black box." 10 6 What

is needed is interdisciplinary research, including in the areas of social
psychology and organizational behavior, in order to fully understand

how decisions are made (including the extent to which such decisions
are influenced by risk taking or conformity) in different corporate
settings.

II.

APPLYING BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TO ANTITRUST

A. The Chicago School's Continuing Influence on
Antitrust Policy Generally
The three key federal antitrust provisions (sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act) do not dictate the
10 7
application of any specific economic assumptions or theories.
Apparently few, if any, economists at the time of the Sherman Act's
Indeed, in
enactment vocally supported antitrust legislation. 10 8
reviewing these provisions' legislative histories, the Supreme Court and

notable antitrust scholars, such as former FTC Chairman Robert
Pitofsky, noted Congress's noneconomic concerns about the
concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the few. 10 9 If neither

106. Coase, supra note 46, at 714, 718.
107. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006), outlaws every
unreasonable "contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006), makes it unlawful for a company to
"'monopolize, or attempt to monopolize" trade or commerce. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006), prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect
"may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
108. "A careful student of the history of economics would have searched long and hard, on
July 2 of 1890, the day the Sherman Act was signed by President Harrison, for any economist
who had ever recommended the policy of actively combating collusion or monopolization in the
economy at large." George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM.

ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1982).
109. The debates in 1890 show "that the main cause which led to the legislation was the
thought that it was required by the economic conditions of the times; that is, the vast
and the widespread
accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals
impression that their power had been and would be exerted to oppress individuals and injure the
public generally." Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911). "[T]he conviction
was universal that the country was in real danger from another kind of slavery sought to be
fastened on the American people, namely, the slavery that would result from aggregations of
capital in the hands of a few individuals and corporations .... Id. at 83 (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting). See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 n.1 (2d
Cir. 1945) ("The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order, and among
them all none is more threatening than the equality of condition, of wealth, and opportunity that
has grown within a single generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combinations to
control production and trade and to break down competition.") (quoting 21 Cong. Rec. 2460
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the statutory terms nor the legislative history compel antitrust enforcers
and the courts to apply the Chicago School's rational choice theories or
any particular economic theory, why has the Chicago School cast such a

large shadow over antitrust policy?
To answer this question, it is helpful to consider briefly the ebb and
flow of antitrust policies before the Reagan Administration. Despite the
outcry against monopolies and trusts in the 1890s, few federal cases
were actually brought in the early years of the Sherman Act. 110 Indeed,
the five antitrust lawyers at the Justice Department 1 1' prosecuted
Eugene V. Debs and other Socialists, as well as labor unions. 112 Of all
antitrust cases prosecuted before 1910, the Department of Justice's

Antitrust Division won only 55.9% of the time. 113 Although antitrust
enforcement was reinvigorated somewhat under Presidents Theodore

(1890)). Likewise, Pitofsky said, "It is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain
political values in interpreting the antitrust laws." Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979). One such political value is a "fear that
excessive concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political pressures." Id.
An antitrust policy that neglected to consider such political values would "be unresponsive to the
will of Congress." Id. at 1052. Sullivan agreed:
To argue, as do the Chicago economists, that antitrust ought to be used solely to inhibit
expressions of market power in a technical economic sense, is not only to miss much in
the history and development of the law, but to ignore much of its potential ... The
political consensus that supports antitrust comes from other sources. Americans
continue to value institutions the scale and the workings of which they can
comprehend. Many continue to value the decentralization of decision making power
and responsibility. Many favor structures in which power in one locus may be checked
by power in another. Antitrust, broadly conceived and sensitively administered, may
contribute to the realization of these values.
Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are The
Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1222-23 (1977); see also Eleanor M.
Fox, The Battlefor the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REV. 917, 919 (1987) (citing concern for the
"little man" and consumers as a goal of antitrust).
110. During the first fourteen years of the Sherman Act, only twenty-two cases were initiated.
Joseph C. Gallo et al., Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement 1955-1997: An Empirical
Study, 17 REV. INDUS. ORG. 75, 90 (2000).
111. Between 1903 and 1913, the Division employed five attorneys. Fowler Hamilton, The
Selection of Cases for Major Investigations, in THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 97 (1940).
112. The eighth federal antitrust action brought by the United States was against Debs. CCH,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: WITH SUMMARY OF CASES INSTITUTED BY THE U.S. 18901951 69 (1952). The United States prosecuted numerous unions and union officials. Id. at 45960 (index of cases against unions); PAUL E. HADLICK, CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS UNDER
SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT 140 (1939) (the first persons to serve jail sentences resulting from
Sherman Act violations were Eugene V. Debs and others, growing out of the Pullman strike of
1894).
113. Arthur G. Frass & Douglas F. Greer, Market Structure & Price Collusion: An Empirical
Analysis, 26 J. INDUS. ECON. 21, 27-28 (1977).
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Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, the Supreme 14Court alternatively
strengthened and hindered government prosecution.1
During the 1920s, antitrust enforcement waned, given the

administrations' concern that vigorous government enforcement might
disrupt the prosperity bandwagon. 115 Between 1929 and 1932, over a
third of the attorneys left the Antitrust Division. 116 In the early 1930s,
the federal government viewed cooperation with businesses as the

priority: "[i]ndustries were organized under codes of 'fair competition'
with their representatives empowered to adjust supply to demand, to
stabilize prices within limits, to regulate wages, and to otherwise
institute self-government under Government supervision." 1' 17 When a
rapid general price advance occurred following the start of World War
118
II, the Justice Department received up to 250 complaints per day.

Between 1938 and 1939, the number of antitrust lawyers at the Antitrust
Division nearly tripled.'1 9 Why should the Sherman Act "which has
been consistently ignored for half a century suddenly become the center
of such intense public concern?" asked Thurman Arnold, who oversaw
the awakened Antitrust Division. 120 According to Arnold, "In the
antitrust laws is found the only expression of our competitive ideals
which we now have." 12 1 It was Arnold's conviction that "if we do not
center the development of tomorrow around the ideal expressed in the
Sherman Act, ineffective though that ideal may have been in the past as
a practical agency, the last obstacle to complete industrial autocracy will

114. The Supreme Court hindered antitrust prosecution with its decisions in United States v.
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) where it held that the trusts' operations did not constitute
interstate commerce. For other early Court decisions that hindered U.S. antitrust, see United
States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619
(1927); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); and Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
115. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTITRUST
LAWS AND CURRENT PROBLEMS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, SUBMITTED TO THE U.S.
SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MONOPOLY 8 (May 23, 1952) [hereinafter 1952 DOJ ANTITRUST
REPORT]; Gallo et al., supra note 110, at 90.
116. The number of attorneys dropped from twenty-nine in 1929 to eighteen in 1932.
Hamilton, supra note 111, at 97. The number rose to twenty-six in 1933, but dropped to fifteen in
1934. Id.
117. 1952 DOJ ANTITRUST REPORT, supra note 115, at 9.
118. Hamilton, supra note 111, at 97.
119. The number increased from fifty-nine as of March 31, 1938, to 144 as of June 30, 1939.
Id. Similarly, the number of criminal and civil antitrust cases increased nearly fourfold after
1939: fifty-seven cases (twenty-seven criminal; thirty civil) between 1935-39 to 223 (163
criminal; sixty civil) between 1940-44. Gallo et al., supra note 110, at 90.
120. Thurman Arnold, Antitrust Law Enforcement, Past and Future, in THE SHERMAN
ANTITRUST ACT AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 8 (1940).
121. Id.
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have disappeared."' 12 2 After World War II,with growing concern for
the increased concentration of economic power, antitrust enforcement
flourished, enjoying bipartisan support. The Clayton Act was amended
1 23
in 1950 to arrest concentration of economic might in its incipiency.
By the 1970s, the agencies' enforcement policy was aggressively aimed
at deconcentrating industries, such as the oil industry. 124 When the
government began challenging mergers between companies with small
market shares, antitrust theory appeared unprincipled, to the point where
Justice Potter Stewart observed, the "sole consistency . . . is that in
' 125
litigation under [merger statute] §7, the Government always wins."
By the 1970s, academics and economists taught by, affiliated with, or
otherwise influenced by several professors at the University of Chicago
were critically examining the prevailing antitrust theories under the lens
of neoclassical economic theory. They did not uniformly adhere to
specific dogma, but generally espoused the theory that most markets are
competitive, mergers and vertical arrangements often create
efficiencies, and market forces will likely redress any attempt to
exercise market power. 12 6 Interference by the government or courts
would likely cause greater harm (in inhibiting the efficient allocation of
scarce resources) than good (promoting allocative efficiency). Instead,
by creating regulatory barriers or thwarting efficiency, the local, state,
or federal government was often the culprit. To interfere in the market,
the government should justify the necessity of its action. Thus,
intervention should be limited to a few egregious antitrust violations,
such as price-fixing or mergers to monopoly, where total welfare is
reduced. 12 7 The Chicago School's general philosophy is that markets,
left alone by government regulators, will often allocate resources

122. Id. at 9.
123. Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21).
124. David Scheffman et al., 20 Years of Merger Guidelines Enforcement at the FTC: An
Economic Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 278 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
be/hilites/ftc20thanniversarypaper.pdf; White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, Task Force
Report on Antitrust Policy 11-12 (May 21, 1969) (Task Force, chaired by Phil Neal, recommended
inter alia remedies to reduce concentration). Bork, who was on the Task Force, issued a separate
statement, dissenting on such measures.
125. United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Some, such as Posner, provide more sweeping condemnation, claiming that much of antitrust law
in 1976 "was an intellectual disgrace." POSNER, supra note 6, at viii.
126. US GAO, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: CHANGES IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICIES &

ACTIVITIES, GAO/GGD-91-2 (Oct. 29, 1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d22t8/
142779.pdf [hereinafter 1990 GAO STUDY].
127. Posner, supra note 33, at 933 (describing Bork's writing as the "orthodox Chicago
position").
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efficiently (that resources gravitate toward their most valuable uses),
and any company's attempt to secure market power would most likely
be defeated by other profit-maximizers (either new entrants or existing
128
competitors).
The Chicago School's emerging influence was visible in the Supreme
12 9
Court's 1977 decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.
where the Court shook off the earlier per se standard of liability for
nonprice vertical restraints, and adopted, as the Chicago School
adherents argued, the more fact-intensive, and more expansive rule-ofreason standard. The Chicago School also influenced the incoming
Reagan Administration's antitrust enforcers. Thereafter, civil nonmerger antitrust enforcement waned, while criminal price-fixing
prosecution increased. Between 1981 and 1988, the federal antitrust
agencies initiated three section 2 cases (which involve claims of
monopolization or attempts to monopolize), the lowest in any eight-year
No new cases involving nonprice vertical
period since 1900.130
restraints or resale price maintenance were initiated. 13 1 Moreover, the
13 2
number of antitrust cases involving Fortune 500 firms dwindled,
leaving some to characterize the Reagan Administration's "aggressive
campaign to collar a hapless, economically trivial parade of asphalt
suppliers, lawyers for indigent criminal defendants, moving and storage
firms, bakeries, individual physicians, obscure trade associations and a
host of other commercial pygmies." 133 Approximately half of the
Department of Justice's Antitrust Division's lawyers left during this
period, 134 and as the GAO reported, the remaining Division staff mostly

128. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (5th ed. 1998).
129. 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
130. William E. Kovacic, Steady Reliever at Antitrust, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1989, at A 14.
131. Gallo et al., supra note 110, at 88 n.20.
132. Id.
133. Kovacic, supra note 130, at A14. As Pitofsky noted:
To a large extent, this administration has only brought the same case over and over
again-a long series of challenges to interrelated regional and local conspiracies in the
construction industry. It has shown little inclination to use its considerable economic
sophistication to develop innovative ways to detect non-construction industry cartels.
Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REV. 817, 819 (1987).
134. The number of Division attorneys declined from over 400 in 1980 to the low 200s by the
late 1980s. 1990 GAO STUDY, supra note 126, at 5. In fiscal year 2004, the number of Division
attorneys was 364. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), DIRECTORATE FOR FIN.
AND ENTER. AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT OF COMPETITION POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 2003-2004 6 (May 25, 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/41/
35111334.pdf.
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targeted price-fixing or bid-rigging involving road construction or
government procurement.13 5
Although a post-Chicago School for antitrust has developed over the
past decade, 136 antitrust, observed Posner, "has to a great extent been
normalized, domesticated. ' 137
The federal
agencies' antitrust
enforcement is still largely shaped by the Chicago School's rational
choice theories. 138 These theories are applied to various conduct, such
as vertical restraints, conduct by a monopolist, and tying. Justice Scalia,
for example, recently characterized collusion as the "supreme evil of
antitrust." 139 The Court's view on monopolies, on the other hand, was
much more forgiving.
Indeed, monopolies and the charging of
monopoly prices were surmised as "an important element of the
free-market system," and the inducement to "attract[] 'business acumen'

135. 1990 GAO STUDY, supra note 126, at 43. Of the 521 restraint of trade cases brought by
the government between fiscal years 1982 and 1988, 245 involved price-fixing or bid-rigging in
road construction and 43 involving government procurement. Id.
136. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-ChicagoAntitrust: A Review & Critique, 2 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 259 (2001); Symposium: Post-Chicago Economics, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 445-695
(1995). One area where post-Chicago School thinking has made some slight inroads is predatory
pricing. For the Chicago School, given predatory pricing's sacrificed profits to drive out a
competitor, and the risks of recoupment, "there is no sufficient reason for antitrust law or the
courts to take predation seriously." Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies &
Counterstrategies,48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 264 (1981). The Supreme Court, relying upon the
Chicago School's writings, concluded that "there is a consensus among commentators that
predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful." Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993). As the Tenth Circuit noted in the
government's most recent predatory pricing case, "[r]ecent scholarship has challenged the notion
that predatory pricing schemes are implausible and irrational." United States v. AMR Corp., 335
F.3d 1109, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic
Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2241 (2000) ("[M]odern economic analysis has
developed coherent theories of predation that contravene earlier economic writing claiming that
predatory pricing conduct is irrational.")). Thus, the Tenth Circuit stated, "Although this court
approaches [the government's predatory pricing claims] with caution, we do not do so with the
incredulity that once prevailed." AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1115. The Division still lost, however.
Id. at 1120-21.
137. POSNER, supra note 6, at viii.
138. Several areas of antitrust law, however, have withstood attack by the Chicago School.
One frequent target was the per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance. Congress in
its 1984 budget appropriation to the Department of Justice included language prohibiting the
Department of Justice from using any funds to overturn or alter the per se prohibition against
resale price maintenance. 1990 GAO STUDY, supra note 126, at 33. But the Court will have the
opportunity in its 2006-2007 term to reconsider the per se ban on certain vertical restraints on
minimum price. PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc., 171 Fed.Appx. 464 (5th Cir.
2006), cert.granted, 127 S.Ct. 763 (2006).
139. Verizon Comm'n, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
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in the first place." 140 A former Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division cited this language in

support of an enforcement hierarchy, consistent with the Chicago
School's antitrust theories: government enforcers would focus primarily
on cartel behavior, followed by mergers, and lastly monopolies. This
third priority's focus was not in prosecuting monopolies, but rather in
developing and promoting objective standards to judge monopoly
behavior, so as not to chill pro-competitive behavior and prevent
monopolists from reaping the rewards of their success. 14 1 Some

antitrust commentators have argued that section 5 of the FIC Act
involving "unfair methods of competition" has been watered down to
the economic consumer welfare standard endorsed by the Chicago
School. 142
B. The Chicago School's Continuing Influence on Merger Policy
Although the Chicago School's rational choice theories permeate
many antitrust policies, this article focuses on the government's current
merger policies, which are largely beholden to the Chicago School.
Moreover, merger analysis over the past few decades has been largely
ex ante, namely, the federal antitrust agencies typically assess the
mergers before they are consummated. 14 3 This makes them a good
vehicle to test the Chicago School's descriptive theories.
140. Id. at 407.
141. See, e.g., R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Securing the Benefits of Global
Competition, Keynote Speech presented at Tokyo American Center (Sept. 10, 2004), availableat
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/205389.htm; R. Hewitt Pate, International Anti-Cartel
Enforcement, Speech presented at 2004 ICN Cartels Workshop, Sydney, Australia (Nov. 21,
2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/206428.htm; U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DiV., UPDATE: PROTECTING AND PROMOTING COMPETITION (Spring 2005),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/216254.htm.
142. Foer, supra note 11, at 47-48.
143. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 ("HSR Act") generally
requires for mergers exceeding the statutory size-of-party and size-of-transaction thresholds, that
the parties before merging first notify the federal antitrust agencies. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18a (West
2004 & Supp. 2006). If either agency requests additional documents and information (commonly
referred to as a Second Request), then the companies cannot merge until after they substantially
comply with this discovery request. Only one agency reviews the merger, and which agency is
subject to a clearance process, based in part on the agency with greater expertise in that industry.
Unless the merger is enjoined, after the acquiring party substantially complies, the parties to cash
tender offers can merge fifteen days thereafter; for most other transactions, after both parties
substantially comply, they can merge twenty days thereafter. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18a(e) (West 2004 &
Supp. 2006). The FTC may also challenge the merger in administrative litigation. Before 1976,
the agencies often were unaware of the merger until after it had been completed, and while
challenging the transaction through protracted litigation, the merger's anticompetitive effects
would hurt consumers and the U.S. economy. In enacting the HSR Act, Congress sought to
mitigate the risk of illegal mergers being completed without a realistic opportunity for the federal
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During this premerger waiting period, the agency must assess
whether the proposed merger may substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly. In making such predictions, the agency
relies upon the Merger Guidelines, 14 4 which represent for Posner, "the
triumph of the economic approach." 145 The Merger Guidelines are
often championed as a resounding success: "No policy document issued
' 146
by the antitrust agencies has been more enduring or far-reaching."
As one FTC official remarked, "[F]or lawyers embarking on their
careers a decade ago, the analytical framework of the Guidelines had
become so well-accepted-so firmly entrenched in everyday antitrust
practice-that they may never have pondered how one might conduct a
merger review without the Guidelines." 147 Thus, for Posner and others,
the intellectual journey for merger review has come to an "end"-an
ending that represents "a modest vindication" of the Chicago School's
approach. 14 8 As the same FTC official proclaimed, "[M]uch of the hard

antitrust agencies to bring an effective challenge. THE ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1976,
S. REP. No.94-803, Part 1, at 63-65.
144. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15.
145. POSNER, supra note 6, at 132; see also Scheffman et al., supra note 124, at 282 (arguing
that the Guidelines are fundamentally grounded in economics).
146. Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of
Justice, Remarks on the Occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the 1982 Merger Guidelines
(June 10, 2002), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/l1253.htm.
147. Tara Isa Koslov, Symposium: Celebrating Twenty Years of the Merger Guidelines, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 185, 186 (2003). Then-Assistant Attorney General Charles James also
questioned merger policy before the 1982 Merger Guidelines:
Looking back over the 20 years since the Baxter Guidelines were announced in June of
1982, it is difficult to fathom the world of merger policy before them. Did we really
define markets based almost entirely on circumstantial indications, such as company
documents or whether producers of a particular product were all in the same trade
association? Did we actually make enforcement decisions based upon little more than
four- and eight-firm concentration ratios, without regard to actual shares held by
individual firms? Did the courts actually sustain challenges to mergers producing a
combined firm with less than five percent of the relevant market? Could it possibly
have been the case that merger enforcement policy was blind to the potential
competitive significance of entry conditions? Was there really a time in which
merger-related efficiencies were viewed with such great skepticism as to be, at best,
neutral, and, at worst, potentially harmful, in government merger review? Amazingly,
the answer to each of the foregoing questions is a resounding yes.
James, supra note 146.
148. POSNER, supra note 6, at 132 ("For the time being, the history of antitrust merger
doctrine [as memorialized in the Merger Guidelines] is at the end"). Over the past 20 years, the
Merger Guidelines have been revised on four occasions. But these revisions essentially retain
"the basic [former Assistant Attorney General William] Baxter formulation, making clarifying
changes, not radical departures." James, supra note 146. Most recently in providing commentary
on the Guidelines, the FTC and DOJ wrote that "a revamping of the Guidelines is neither needed
nor widely desired at this time." FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY
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intellectual work already had been done," the "[k]ey ideological battles
had been fought," and "certain presumptions (for example, relating to
market structure and entry) had been established." 149 Everyone should

be grateful, because we all "speak the same language and agree on the
rules

"...
,150

No doubt the Merger Guidelines, which apply to all industries subject
to the antitrust laws, 15 1 provide a helpful analytical framework in which
the private bar and government enforcers may discuss a pending
merger. They also provide transparency as to which mergers the
government would likely investigate and challenge. Besides the federal
antitrust enforcers, the courts have largely incorporated the Guidelines'
analytical framework in their merger decisions. 15 2 Some courts even
rely upon the Guidelines analysis in cases not involving mergers1 5 3 or
54
antitrust generally. 1
But the intellectual journey has not come to an end, whereby all can

enjoy the deep slumber of decided opinion. Instead, as the burgeoning
behavioral economics literature beckons, we have miles to go before we

can sleep.

ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (March 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm [hereinafter Guidelines Commentary].
149. Koslov, supra note 147, at 186-7.
150. Id. at 187.
151. Although there are no industry-specific merger guidelines, the federal antitrust agencies
in their Health Care Guidelines do discuss how they would apply the Merger Guidelines to
hospital mergers. See Dep't of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy in Health Care, Statement 1 (Aug. 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/179 1.pdf.
152. Courts recognize that the Merger Guidelines do not have the force of law. See, e.g., Olin
Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1993). But many courts cite and rely upon them in
examining whether the merger may substantially lessen competition. See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz
Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 120
(D.D.C. 2004); United States v. Sunguard Data Sys., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 182 (D.D.C.
2001); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2001); FTC v.
Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 159 (D.D.C. 2000); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F.
Supp. 2d 34, 53 (D.D.C. 1998); Advocacy Org. v. Mercy Health Serv., 987 F. Supp. 967, 973-74
(E.D. Mich. 1997); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1081-82 (D.D.C. 1997).
153. See, e.g., Natsource, L.L.C. v. GFI Group, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 626, 636 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (applying Guidelines' entry analysis to monopolization claims); United States v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (applying Guidelines' market
definition analysis to section 1 restraint of trade claims).
154. See Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys. 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(applying Guidelines' market share presumptions regarding market power to plaintiffs' federal
discrimination claims). Interestingly, the district court, earlier in its opinion, recognized the
shortcomings of rational choice theory. Id. at 888. Given the behavioral economics research,
rational choice theory's "'assumptions must be relaxed, and perhaps, ultimately replaced, if
economic theory is to have any application to what happens in actual markets." Id.
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C. Merger Guidelines' Five Assumptions

The Merger Guidelines recognize that "mechanical application" to a
broad range of industries "may provide misleading answers to the
economic questions raised under the antitrust laws." 155 Moreover, the
Guidelines recognize that "the picture of competitive conditions that
develops from historical evidence may provide an incomplete answer to
the forward-looking inquiry of the Guidelines." 15 6 Therefore, the
agencies are not beholden to the Guidelines, and are encouraged to
apply them simply as guidelines, both "reasonably and flexibly to the
157
particular facts and circumstances of each proposed merger."
Despite the Guidelines' call for flexibility, the analytical framework
largely remains fixed. In predicting whether the merger will create or
enhance market power, the government under the Merger Guidelines
will: (i) define the relevant product and geographic market; (ii) calculate
the market participants' shares in that relevant antitrust market; (iii)
determine that market's concentration level; (iv) determine whether
conditions in that concentrated market may enable the merging firms to
lessen competition unilaterally or through coordinated interaction with
other market participants; (v) determine whether such attempt to
exercise market power would be defeated by timely, likely, and
sufficient entry; and (vi) evaluate certain defenses to an otherwise
problematic merger.
In making these determinations, the agency will assume that actual
behavior comports with rational (i.e., profit-maximizing) behavior, and
will inquire whether rational profit-maximizing consumers and
producers "'likely would' take certain actions, that is, whether the
action is in the actor's economic interest." 158
Overlaying this
assumption are at least five more assumptions: (i) the relevant
anticompetitive effects would manifest themselves as higher prices; (ii)
anticompetitive effects are likely to occur only in highly concentrated
155.

Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 0.

156. Id.
157. Id. A history of price fixing within an industry, for example, may raise concern with the
-agencies and courts that a merger in that industry will lessen competition. See FTC v. Elders

Grain, 868 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Allied Waste Indus., Inc., Civ. Action
No. 99 CV 0894 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 1999) (Competitive Impact Statement) ("Overt collusion has
been documented in more than a dozen criminal and civil antitrust cases brought in the last
decade and a half. Such collusion typically involves customer allocation and price-fixing, and

where it has occurred, has been shown to persist for many years."); United States v. GeorgiaPacific Corp., Civ. Action No. 96-164 (D. Del. March 29, 1996) (Competitive Impact Statement)
("In addition, at least once every generation this century, civil or criminal actions have exposed
successful price-fixing agreements among the dominant gypsum board manufacturers.").
158. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 0.1.
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(not moderately concentrated to unconcentrated) markets; (iii) even in
highly concentrated markets, anticompetitive effects are unlikely, absent
certain economic conditions that would facilitate collusion (e.g., absent
big buyers or sellers that would discipline any non-cost-based price
increase post-merger); (iv) anticompetitive effects are unlikely, absent
high entry barriers; and (v) many companies merge to generate
significant efficiencies.
But whether these five assumptions hold true across industries has
not been empirically verified. Moreover, it appears anecdotally that
some corporate behavior is (or is not) occurring that is not readily
explainable under the Merger Guidelines' rational choice theories.
1. Assumption That Relevant Anticompetitive Effects
Would Manifest Themselves as Higher Prices
A merger may substantially lessen competition in many ways, such
as eliminating choices for consumers, or reducing quality, services, or
innovation. In certain industries, price may be less significant than
access. For example, in some industries, companies may enter with a
technological advancement, exploit their competitive advantage, and
then be eventually displaced by the next innovator. The entrenched
competitors, rather than simply raising price, may employ anticompetitive measures to thwart these innovators from accessing the
marketplace with their disruptive technologies. 159 If, as some observe,
"markets create more surprise and innovation than do corporations," the
more important antitrust goal in these markets may be to keep them
open (by cracking down, for example, on vertical restraints that
significantly raise entrants' costs) rather than keep prices low. Another
example is media mergers, which besides advertising rates, may
substantially lessen editorial competition. 160
Mergers may also
implicate noneconomic concerns, such as the political ramifications of
economic power concentrated in the hands of the few. Media
159. Michael Porter, for example, has questioned whether antitrust should be focused
primarily on price competition, when other parameters of competition, such as innovation or

productivity, may play a more important role. Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: A
Productivity-Based Approach at
3-4
(revised May
30,
2002),
available at
http://www.isc.hbs.edu/053002antitrust.pdf;
Foer, supra note 11, at 28-29; see also

BEINHOCKER, supra note 2, at 329-34. Even in price-fixing cartels, competitors may take steps
to thwart entry by restricting information about technology. See Simon J. Evenett, Margaret C.
Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s, 24
WORLD ECON. 1221, 1227-29 (2001), available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/toc/twcc/
24/9.

160. For a discussion of the limitations of the Merger Guidelines on media mergers, see
Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J.
249 (2001).
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concentration may diminish the marketplace of ideas, which the First
Amendment seeks to foster for a healthy democracy. Although the
political implications of a monopoly may be beyond quantification, as
Oliver Williamson recognized in his often-cited antitrust article, the
issue is nevertheless important and cannot be ignored. 16 1
The Merger Guidelines, however, relegate nonprice competition to
one footnote1 62 and do not address any of the noneconomic factors
found in the antitrust laws' legislative history. Instead, the Guidelines
are restricted to one parameter of competition, namely price. In asking
whether the merger creates or enhances market power, or facilitates its
exercise, the Guidelines define market power for a seller as the "ability
profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant
period of time." 16 3 The Guidelines' key question then for merging
companies' customers is: what would happen if the merging companies
raised prices by a small but significant nontransitory amount, generally
five percent? 164 Some customers, in my experience, opine they would
have no option but to accept the price increase. Other customers
disagree, and a few clever ones challenge the question itself, saying,
"You got it all wrong. The merging parties wouldn't raise price, rather
they would decrease the levels of services or discounts" or "repackage
the product, and then raise price." They recognize that a merger may
substantially lessen competition in other ways, such as eliminating
choice for consumers, or by reducing quality, services, or innovation.
Under the Guidelines' rational choice theory, a price increase is a
price increase is a price increase. If customers care about value-added
services or quality, that incremental benefit should be reflected in the
price. Because a reduction in discounts is equivalent to an increase in
net price, under rational choice theory the way the choice is described
should not influence the profit-maximizing consumer's response.

161. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58
AM. ECON. REv. 18, 28-29 (1968).
162. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 0.1 n.6. ("Sellers with market power
also may lessen competition on dimensions other than price, such as product quality, service or

innovation.").
163. Id. at § 0.1.
164. Id. at § 0.1. The Merger Guidelines will use prevailing prices, "unless premerger
circumstances are strongly suggestive of coordinated interaction in which case the Agency will
use a price more reflective of the competitive price." Id. Although some might question why the

agencies would measure market shares, when direct evidence of market power exists. See FTC v.
Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (no need to define markets when direct
evidence of market power exists). Moreover, the hypothetical price increase may be larger or
smaller depending on the industry. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 1.11.
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But the behavioral economics literature suggests that "framing
effects" (how the issue is worded or framed) do matter. Consumers
typically base a deal's "value" on the deviation from an established
reference point (for example, a sale of twenty percent off the regular
price). 165 Deviations from the perceived reference point are marked by
asymmetric price elasticity, whereby many test subjects were more
sensitive to price increases than price cuts. 16 6 For example, the majority
of people, in one survey, indicated that a car dealer's elimination of a
$200 discount off the list price for a popular vehicle was acceptable,
whereas seventy-one percent viewed selling the vehicle $200 above the
list price as unfair. 167 Both produce the same effect-a higher net retail
price-but the direction of the deviation to or from the established
reference point differed. Rather than increasing the list price, which
may provoke consumer anger, the merging parties may cancel or reduce
the level or size of discounts, which may face less resistance from
168
consumers.
Besides offering fewer coupons, BOGOs (buy-one-get-one-free), or
other promotions, the merged entity company may obtain supracompetitive profits by maintaining the price but reducing the number of
choices or the level of services or quality. In United States v. Franklin

165. Differing reference points for the same product may lead to paradoxical results. As
Thaler noted, test subjects would be willing to pay $2.65 for a beer brought back to the beach
from a fancy resort hotel, but only $1.50 for a beer brought back to the beach from a small rundown grocery store. Given that the consumption experience (drinking the beer on the beach) is
the same, under rational choice theory, the place of purchase should be irrelevant. Thaler, supra
note 71, at 82.
166. Price elasticity of a good is the change in quantity demanded, in percentage terms,
divided by the percentage change in its price. Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild, in
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 148, 152 (Camerer ed., 2004). Thus, many consumers
"dislike price increases more than they like the windfall gain from price cuts and will cut back
purchases more when prices rise compared with the extra amount they buy when prices fall." Id.
167. Kameman et al., supra note 75, at 257. One also sees this behavior with respect to
merchants that impose a surcharge for customers using a credit card with a higher interchange fee
(given that the merchant bears a cost for accepting a credit card) versus offering the consumer a
discount if she paid with cash (or a credit or debit card with a lower interchange fee). After the
credit card companies' No-Discrimination Rule was abolished, Dutch merchants could impose
surcharges or offer discounts, based on how the customer was going to pay. Over seventy percent
of the merchants surveyed were unaware of the rule's abolition, and eighty-nine percent of the
merchants did not surcharge customers. Nine percent of the merchants offered discounts to
customers who paid by different means. Of the consumers surveyed, seventy-four percent
thought it (very) bad if a merchant asked for a surcharge for using a credit card. But when asked
about a merchant offering a discount, only forty-nine percent thought it (very) bad, with twentytwo percent neutral and twenty-one percent saying it is a (very) good thing. ITM Research, The
Abolition of the No-Discrimination Rule at 7-8 (March 2000), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/antitrust/cases/29373/studies/netherlands/report.pdf.
168. Kahneman et al., supra note 75, at 257.
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Electric Co.,169 for example, the monopolist did not charge supracompetitive prices between 1988 and 1995 when it was the only player
in the relevant market. But what concerned the court was the extensive
evidence that the monopolist during that same time period "was not
overly concerned about either making improvements in its product or
170
providing excellent service."
Even in the context of prices, the Merger Guidelines assume a price
increase. But competitive pressures may require companies, as they
maximize operational efficiencies, to reduce prices over time. Thus, a
merger may lessen competition, as Judge Sporkin noted, by halting or
slowing the rate of price decreases in that industry. 171 As the behavioral
economics literature suggests, while many people surveyed would
accept a cost-based price increase, they seemingly would not demand
the converse: namely, demanding that the firm lower its price when its
costs decrease. 17 2 Thus, the merged entity, instead of lowering prices
(and thereby change the established reference point), may simply keep
the prices stable.
Consequently, more empirical research is required on what happens
post-merger than simply whether list prices increased. Did the company
retain any cost savings longer than it had in the past? What became of
discounts? What happened to other nonprice components of competition, such as service, quality, and most importantly innovation?
2. Assumption That Anticompetitive Effects Likely Occur Only in
Highly Concentrated (Not Moderately to Unconcentrated) Industries
In assessing a merger's likely competitive effects, the agencies and
courts next determine the merging parties' market shares and the level
of concentration in the relevant market. 17 3 The assumption is that the
169. United States v. Franklin Elec. Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1034-35 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
170. Id. at 1035.
171. FTC v. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 65 (D.D.C. 1998). Likewise, the FTC made,
and the court accepted, a similar argument in Staples. FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066,
1082 n.14 (D.D.C. 1997).
172. Kahneman et al., supra note 75, at 260.
173. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 1.0; CardinalHealth, 12 F. Supp. 2d
at 52. To define markets, the Guidelines rely on demand substitution factors, namely "a product
(or group of products) and a geographic area in which it is produced or sold such that a
hypothetical profit maximizing firm, not subject to price regulation, that was the only present and
future producer or seller ... would impose a 'small but significant and nontransitory' increase in
price ["SSNIP"], assuming the terms of sale of all other products are held constant." Id. One
issue is whether SSNIP leads to the right results. For example, despite studies of increasing
prices in the academic publishing industry after successive mergers, the industry dynamics are not
easily explainable under the Merger Guidelines' SSNIP test. See Aaron S. Edlin & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Exclusion or Efficient Pricing? The "Big Deal" Bundling of Academic Journals, 72
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merger is unlikely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its
exercise unless it significantly increases concentration and results in a
concentrated market, properly defined and measured. 174 A horizontal
merger, by definition, increases concentration as it eliminates an
independent competitor from the marketplace. By decreasing the
number of competitors by one, a merger should in theory make
collusion incrementally easier. The assumption is that the costs for
agreeing to the terms of collusion, and in policing and punishing any
5
cheating thereto, are tied in part to the number of competitors. 17 The
fewer the competitors, the less likely the divergence in their preferences
over the collusive equilibrium (how much to restrict output and increase
price), the fewer the options for buyers (and ability to play one
competitor off the other), and the greater the impact each competitor has
on price (thus making cheating by anyone more noticeable). Increasing
concentration thereby makes collusion easier, by lowering the costs of
getting everyone to agree to collude, and of policing and effectively
punishing cheating (by selling slightly below the cartel price to garner
76
greater profits). 1
Although each horizontal merger increases concentration, and
increases, in theory, the likelihood of collusion, it would be an
untenable economic policy to enjoin every merger. The federal antitrust
agencies must predict when a merger substantially increases the
likelihood of such tacit or explicit collusion. Is it when the market goes
from ten competitors to nine? Or from six competitors to five? Or from
three to two? Bork argued that any merger that left three competitors is
177
presumptively lawful.
The Merger Guidelines assume that market power through such
coordination would be feasible only in highly concentrated markets, as
measured under the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"). HHIs are
ANTITRUST L.J. 119, 127 (2004). Ordinarily these academic journals are complements; so if
Company B, which publishes biology journals, merges with Company E, which publishes poetry
journals, that by itself under the Merger Guidelines should not provide market power. That is,
because if the merged company raises the biology journals' prices, librarians would not be
expected to switch to the poetry journals.
174. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 1.0.
175. POSNER, supra note 6, at 124.
176. FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[W]here rivals are few,
firms will be able to coordinate their behavior, either by overt collusion or implicit understanding,

in order to restrict output and achieve profits above competitive levels."); Hosp. Corp. of Am. v.
FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1387 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) ("The fewer competitors there are in a
market, the easier it is for them to coordinate their pricing..."); American Hosp. Supply Corp. v.
Hosp. Prod. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 602 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[lIt is easier for two firms to collude

without being detected than for three to do so.").
177.

BORK, supra note 34, at 221-22.
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derived by summing the squares of each competitor's market share. 178

The first important variable is the industry's HHI post-merger. The
second important variable is the change in HHI,namely the number of
points, by which the merger increases the market's HHI. 179 The Merger
Guidelines assume that mergers

"are unlikely to have adverse

competitive effects" and thus "ordinarily require no further analysis" in:
(i) unconcentrated markets (post-merger HHI below 1,000);
(ii) moderately concentrated markets (post-merger HHIl below 1,800)
where the merger increases the HHI by less than 100; and

(iii) highly concentrated markets (post-merger HHI above 1,800),
where the merger increases the HHI by less than fifty.
Mergers in moderately concentrated markets (post-merger 1H1
between 1,000 and 1,800) that increase the HHI by more than 100
points "potentially raise significant concerns." 180 Mergers in highly
concentrated markets (post-merger HHI above 1,800) that increase the
HHI by more than 100 points are presumed to create or enhance market

power; that presumption can be rebutted by other factors, such as
entry. 181
Although Orin Herfindahl cautioned that the HHI index could
sidetrack consideration of the fundamental objectives of the antitrust
laws, 182 neither the Guidelines nor the agencies rely on any other
measure of industry concentration. The HHI,Posner instructs, is better
suited than other measures because it "gives (negative weight) to the
existence of a fringe of small sellers, which as we already know is a
market condition inimical to collusion." 183 The federal courts have
"come to accept the HHI as the most prominent and accurate method of
measuring market concentration." 184 Indeed, in denying the FTC's
178. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 1.5. The HHIs range from 10,000 (a
monopoly with 100% of the market) to a number approaching zero (for atomistic markets where
each firm's share is less than 1). For example, a market with ten competitors each with a ten
percent market share would have a HHI of 1000.
179. The HHI increase is measured by doubling the product of the merging firms' market
shares. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 1.51. For example, the HHI would
increase by 100 for a merger between firms with a 5 and 10 percent shares (2*10*5).
180. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 1.5 1(b).
181. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 1.51(c).
182. Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective:
Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 946 n.56 (1987).
183. POSNER, supra note 6, at 70.
184. FTC v. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 53 (D.D.C. 1998), citing FrC v. University
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1211 n.12 (11th Cir. 1991). See also FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798
F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (describing HHI as a superior measure to cruder methods for
assessing market concentration); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1081-82 (D.D.C. 1997)
(relying on the HHI value as a reliable indicator).
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motion to enjoin one merger, the district court used the HHI against the
FTC, noting that a merger's increase in HHI was not "an overwhelming
statistical case for the likely creation or enhancement of anticompetitive
85

market power." 1

HHIls, despite their aura of mathematical exactitude, have several
frailties. First, the HHIls are manipulable by how broadly or narrowly
the agencies and defense counsel define the relevant market. The
broader the market is defined (e.g., all beverages sold throughout the
world), the lower the firms' market shares and HHIs. The more
narrowly defined the market (e.g., branded cola soft drinks sold in the
tri-state New York area), the higher the firms' market shares and Hls.
Second, despite HHIls' aura of mathematical certainty, there is
nothing certain about the HHI levels. As Posner concedes, "it is
impossible to specify a threshold figure above which collusion becomes
an attractive proposition," 186 or below which collusion is unlikely. No
doubt with sufficiently high market shares (such as seventy percent of
the properly defined market with high entry barriers), one could assume
monopolistic behavior. But each industry may have its own critical
threshold HHI whereby collusion is significantly likely. These critical
thresholds are only discoverable inductively through systematic
empirical testing.
Third, the Guidelines assume that mergers "that either do not
significantly increase concentration or do not result in a concentrated
market ordinarily require no further analysis."1 87 In reality, the federal
antitrust enforcement agencies in recent years have rarely challenged
mergers that fell below 1,800 in HH1Is. 188 The trend line since 1982
(when the HHI thresholds were introduced) is for the agencies to
challenge mergers in industries with very high HHIs, and increasingly
fewer mergers in industries with a HHI below 2,000.189 Indeed, of the
185. FTC v. Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 129 (D.D.C. 2004) (calculations of increase in
HHI ranged between 49 and 254 points).
186. POSNER, supra note 6, at 70. The Guidelines also express caution as "the numerical
divisions suggest greater precision than is possible with the available economic tools and
information." Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 1.5.
187. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 1.51.
188.

FED. TRADE COMM'N, TRANSPARENCY AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: THE

HORIZONTAL MERGER REVIEW PROCESS 58 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/02/
0502economicissues.pdf [hereinafter TRANSPARENCY].

189. Of the FTC's 113 enforcement actions against mergers between 1983 and 2000 where
the competitive concerns were limited to only one market, the lowest HHI jumped from 1,566 (in
the period of 1983-1984) to 2545 (in 1985-86), and except for one year remained well over
2,000. Scheffman et al., supra note 124, at 300. Likewise, the median HHIs alleged in the FTC
complaints challenging these mergers started from around 1,800 in 1983-84 and reached 5,000
by 1991-92. Id. During the Reagan Administration, generally, neither antitrust agency, with the
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441 mergers against which the FTC took enforcement action between
fiscal years 1996 and 2003, twenty-nine percent were mergers to

monopoly (two firms to one), thirty-five percent were mergers to
duopolies (three firms to two), and twenty-three percent were from four
firms to three. 190 Thus, eighty-seven percent of the merger cases that
the FTC challenged involved mergers that would have left three or
fewer competitors in the marketplace. 19 1 As the FTC stated, mergers
from five to four competitors are "usually not subject to enforcement
action, although . . . [HIls] over 3,000 trigger a small chance of
enforcement." 19 2 Likewise, of the 1,263 mergers that the federal
antitrust agencies challenged between 1999 and 2003, less than fourteen
percent involved a HHI below 2,400.193

Although the agencies require high HHIs as a condition precedent for
challenging the merger, an important empirical question remains
unanswered: whether a positive correlation exists across all industries
between concentration levels and the parameters of an industry's

competitiveness (e.g., low prices, better service and quality, more
innovation, increased productivity).
Relying solely on concentration levels may increase the risk of false

positives.

Although some studies demonstrate that firms in more

concentrated industries enjoy higher profits or higher prices, 194 firms in

highly concentrated industries may enjoy higher profits because they
operate above the minimum efficient scale and thus have lower costs.
exception of one merger, challenged mergers with a post-merger industry HHI below 1,800, and
challenged only two cases where the post-merger HHI was within the 1,800 and 2,000 range.
Warren S. Grimes, Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 953
(2003).
190. TRANSPARENCY, supra note 188, at 64.
191. Percentages calculated from the data on Table 4.1. Id. Thirty-two mergers were
challenged involving mergers from five to four firms (seven of which were in the oil markets),
thirteen mergers from six firms to five (six of which were in the oil markets), two from seven to
six (one of which were in the oil markets), six mergers from eight to seven (all in the oil markets),
and two from ten to nine firms (both were in the oil markets). Id. at 64, 66.
192. Id. at 23.
193. Fifty-seven mergers (4.5%) involved a market with a post-merger HHI below 1,800,
forty mergers (3.1%) between 1,799 and 1,999, and seventy-eight mergers (6.2%) between 2,000
and 2,399. FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MERGER CHALLENGES DATA, FISCAL
YEARS 1999-2003 (2003), at Table 1, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/201898.htm.
194. Economists have differed over the conclusions to draw from these studies. For a
discussion of these studies and criticisms, see, e.g., Craig M. Newmark, Price-Concentration
Studies: There You Go Again, prepared for DOJ/FTC Merger Workshop (Feb. 14, 2004),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/mergerenforce/presentations/040217newmark.pdf; Paul A.
Pautler, Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Bureau of Economics,
Working Paper No. 243 (2001); Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and
Performance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 983-88 (Richard Schmalensee &
Robert Willig eds., 1989).
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Alternatively, such firms may enjoy higher prices and profits due to
innovation or consumer demand developed over years of brand
development. Market share may also be highly contestable. 195 Also, an
increase in concentration could in theory make coordination less likely.
Merger-related efficiencies may drive down the marginal cost of the
acquiring company's products, enabling it to lower price below the
19 6
levels of its less efficient competitors, and thereby increase revenues.
To minimize this risk of false positives, the Merger Guidelines have
evolved to where high concentration alone is insufficient to challenge a
merger. Rather, high concentration is a condition precedent for
challenging a transaction. The agencies must still provide a theory of
the likely anticompetitive effects (such as the merger facilitating
collusion or permitting the merged entity to unilaterally increase
19 7
prices).
Although the Guidelines minimize the risk of such false positives, the
risk of false negatives remains. In reviewing their recent merger data,
the antitrust agencies state that "[although large market shares and high
concentration by themselves are an insufficient basis for challenging a
merger, low market shares and concentration are a sufficient basis for
not challenging a merger." 19 8 This assumption would be empirically
sound if collusion does not occur in moderately to unconcentrated
markets (HHIs below 1,800). The Department of Justice, however, has
criminally or civilly prosecuted cartels in unconcentrated or moderately
concentrated markets, the structure of which, under the Merger
Guidelines, should not be susceptible to such collusion. As the
Antitrust Division's former Deputy Assistant Attorney General William
Kolasky observed in 2002, cartels can involve a fairly large number of
firms. Five or six members were common and occasionally the
Department of Justice uncovered cartels with ten or more competitors:
195. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 1.521. For example, in markets with
frequent technological changes that bring new products, current market shares may not accurately
predict future market power. Likewise, if many sales are made under long-term contracts, then
market shares may significantly shift when these contracts come up for bid. Cf United States v.
Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501 (1974) ("[E]vidence of past production does not, as a
matter of logic, necessarily give a proper picture of company's future ability to compete.").
196. Id. at § 4.
197. See id. at § 2.0 (market share and concentration data provide only the starting point for
analyzing a merger's competitive impact). As a former Assistant Attorney General of the
Division observed, the Merger Guidelines "abandon the notion that the agencies are likely to
challenge a merger based solely or primarily on structural criteria" such as market concentration
and "establish a clear linkage between concentration and the analysis of competitive effects."
Charles A. James, Overview of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 447,
449 (1993).
198. MERGER CHALLENGES DATA, supra note 193, at 2.
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"This appears to be due in part at least to fringe players in the market

feeling they will profit more by going along with the cartel than by
trying to take share away from the larger firms by undercutting their
prices." 199 Examples include: (i) Nasdaq-twenty-four market makers
plus unnamed co-conspirators; 200 (ii) Real Estate (New York)--dozens
of bidders; 20 1 (iii) Explosives-fourteen corporations in regional and
national conspiracies; 20 2 (iv) Point-of-Purchase Display Materialstwenty-four individuals and nine corporations ;203 (v) Graphite
Electrodes-six firms; 20 4 (vi) Sorbates-five major producers; 20 5 (vii)
eight Ivy League universities and MIT; 206 and (viii) numerous Vitamin
manufacturers in different markets (the "most pervasive and harmful
criminal antitrust conspiracy"). 207 This is not a recent phenomenon.
One empirical analysis of successfully prosecuted cartels between 1910
and 1972 likewise showed that cartels on average had many
participants: where a trade association facilitated collusion, 33.6 firms
was the mean of firms involved, and fourteen firms was the median; in

association involved) 8.3 firms was
price-fixing cartels (without a trade
20 8
the mean and six was the median.

199. William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: from Dead Frenchmen to
Beautiful Minds and Mavericks, Speech at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting
Washington, D.C., 17 (April 24, 2002).
200. See Complaint, United States v. Alex Brown & Sons Inc., Civ. Act. No. (S.D.N.Y.
complaint filed July 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/fO700/O740.htm (alleging
that from at least as early as 1989 through 1996, common understanding arose among the
defendants and other Nasdaq market makers concerning, among other things, the manner in
which bids and asks would be displayed on Nasdaq).
201. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., ANN. REP. FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999 36-37,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/4523.pdf [hereinafter 1999 DIVISION ANNUAL
REPORT].
202. Id.at 33.
203. Id. at 34.
204. OECD, HARD CORE CARTELS 13 (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
39/63/2752129.pdf.
205. See COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/34830214.pdf (discussing a seventeen-year international
price-fixing conspiracy in the food preservatives industry).
206. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 661 (3d Cir. 1993) (civil antitrust case
charging eight Ivy League universities and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with
violating the Sherman Act by illegally conspiring to restrain price competition on financial aid to
prospective students).
207. 1999 DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 201, at 25-26.
208. Frass & Greer, supra note 113, at 25, 36-41. One conservative assumption in that
empirical study was that the number of cartel members prosecuted reflected the total number of
firms in the relevant market. Id. at 24. But, aside from ineffectual fringe firms, the relevant
market may contain more participants than reflected in the government's indictment or criminal
information, which does not always identify all the co-conspirators. Consequently, the authors
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Indeed, a study of the government's price-fixing actions brought
between 1955 and 1965 found no statistically significant relationship
between industry structure (i.e., concentration) and propensity to pricefix. 20 9 Of all defendants in national industries that were convicted of

price-fixing, approximately seventy percent were in low to moderately
concentrated, barely concentrated, or atomistic industries. 2 10 Likewise,
the GAO studied enforcement and investigative resources spent by the
Department of Justice on horizontal price-fixing violations in
manufacturing industries. As the GAO reported in 1980, only thirtythree percent of the government's resources were aimed at concentrated
industries, and only twenty-three percent of the litigation efforts were in
2 11
these industries.
The anomaly becomes apparent. If, under the Merger Guidelines,
collusion (tacit or express) is unlikely in unconcentrated or moderately
concentrated markets, why were the majority of the government's
resources in the 1970s devoted to investigating price-fixing in
unconcentrated industries, and why has the government over the past
century prosecuted many cartels in moderately or unconcentrated
industries?
One explanation for this anomaly may be the structure and incentives
of the different sections within the Department of Justice's Antitrust
Division. The Division's regional field offices criminally prosecute per
se illegal offenses, such as price-fixing and bid-rigging, while most of
its offices in Washington, D.C., since the mid-1990s, investigate
primarily civil "rule-of-reason" matters, including mergers.
The
had to exclude from its sample of 606 cases, those cases where the number of firms allegedly
involved were not specified in the records. Id. at 25-26. Some co-conspirators conceivably
could escape prosecution (through lack of evidence). Although the authors rely upon an earlier
study, which showed a 0.959 correlation between the number of conspirators and total number of
firms in the market, the sample size of that earlier study was 34 cases. Id. at 28 n.17, citing
George Hay & Daniel Kelly, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & ECON.
13 (1974). For studies of cartels immunized from the antitrust laws, see, e.g., Andrew R. Dick,
Identifying Contracts, Combinations & Conspiraciesin Restraint of Trade, 17 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 203, 213 (1996) (discussing that cartels formed more frequently in
unconcentrated industries under Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act); see also Paul S. Clyde &
James D. Reitzes, The Effectiveness of Collusion Under Antitrust Immunity: The Case of Liner
Shipping Conferences, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF REPORT (Dec. 1995) (finding a positive,
but economically small, relationship between overall market concentration and shipping rates),
availableat http://www.ftc.gov/reports/shipping.pdf.
209. JAMES M. CLABAULT & JOHN F. BURTON, JR., SHERMAN ACT INDICTMENTS 1955-1965:
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 135-37 (1966).
210. Id. at 136.
211. GAO, REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS: CLOSER CONTROLS AND BETTER DATA COULD
IMPROVE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 77 (1980), available at http://archive.gao.gov/f0202/
11 1680.pdf.
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Division's prosecutors in criminal investigations do not typically rely on
the economic theories underlying the Merger Guidelines. As the
Antitrust Division's top criminal prosecutor recently said, "You can't
catch a thief with an economist."2 12 Instead, the prosecutors' cartel
profiling is grounded on human behavior, not economic theory:
The Division will target its proactive efforts in industries where we
suspect cartel activity in adjacent markets or which involve one or
more common players from other cartels. When we are able to identify
culpable executives, we begin digging deeper to determine whether
they had pricing authority on other products over time and then for
indicia of collusion in those products as well. We might investigate
who mentored the culpable executives and what other products they
21
were responsible for overseeing, and we keep digging. 3
The Department of Justice would not likely deny a conspirator
amnesty because the industry structure was not conducive to collusion
under the Merger Guidelines. Instead, the criminal prosecutors go
where the evidence leads them.
But this enforcement anomaly does not address the fundamental
question: why is collusion occurring in moderately to unconcentrated
markets? One explanation may be that explicit price-fixing is necessary
for less concentrated industries, in contrast to oligopolies, where the
competitors can tacitly collude (i.e., each firm setting its price based
partly on the strategic considerations regarding its competitors'
behavior).2 1 4 Logically, companies would not expressly collude (and
expose themselves to criminal antitrust liability and civil trebled
damages) where they tacitly, without any formal agreement, could set
their prices at "a profit-maximizing, supra-competitive level by
recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence
with respect to price and output decisions." 2 15 Thus, industries where
criminal price-fixing occurs may represent the outer-boundary: namely,
where collusion is possible (i.e., cartel members can agree upon terms,
and police and punish any defection), but only through formal

212. Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Ten
Strategies for Winning the Fight Against Hardcore Cartels, at the OECD Competition Committee
(Oct. 18, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/212270.ppt.
213. Scott D. Hammond, Director of Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust Division, Cornerstones
Of An Effective Leniency Program, Presented before the ICN Workshop on Leniency Programs,
Sydney, Australia, at 15-16 (Nov. 22-23, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
20661 l.pdf.
214. See, e.g., Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 483-84 (1st Cir.
1988) (discussing firms following industry leaders in setting prices); ROBERT S. PINDYCK &
DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 431 (2d ed. 1992).
215. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993).
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measures. As the number of cartel members decreases through mergers,
the need for these formal measures to achieve supra-competitive prices
becomes less likely. 2 16 Should the antitrust agencies be concemed only
if the merger substantially increases the companies' ability to tacitly
(rather than expressly) collude? As the Merger Guidelines recognize,
the Clayton Act seeks to prevent mergers that substantially increase the
likelihood of coordinated interaction, which includes "tacit or express
After all, the Clayton Act seeks to arrest such
collusion." 2 17
anticompetitive effects in their incipiency, and the economic harm from
express collusion is no worse than from tacit collusion. 2 18 Moreover,
the Department of Justice's criminal prosecutions do not necessarily
capture all collusion. Prosecutors go where the evidence directs them,
and thus criminal cases may cluster around specific industries.
Prosecutors may also investigate an industry's supra-competitive
pricing but lack sufficient evidence to prove an agreement beyond a
reasonable doubt.
This still leaves the question why so many competitors can expressly
collude if, under the Merger Guidelines' rational choice theories,
agreeing to the terms of such collusion and detecting and punishing any
defections should be difficult. One answer may lie in the behavioral
economics research: namely, price-fixers, like the test subjects in other
experiments, may be more trustful and cooperative than rational choice
theory predicts. Such experiments show that where trust will lead to
more favorable outcomes, people tend to trust at a higher level than if
Other
all are operating under a traditional game theory. 2 19
neuroeconomics literature suggests that some people are more likely to
be trustful and tend to cooperate, while others are more likely to behave
according to the standard game theory predictions. 2 20 Trust then can be
either socially beneficial or detrimental, and each individual's level of
trust may vary. An additional critical variable may be whether a

216. Frass & Greer, supra note 113, at 29. This was a key assumption in Frass & Greer's
empirical analysis-they believed that explicit collusion "will occur only when it is both possible
and necessary to the maximization of joint-profits."
217. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 2.1.
218. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957)
("Section 7 is designed ... to arrest in their incipiency restraints ... in a relevant market which,
as a reasonably probability, appear at the time of suit likely to result from the acquisition .... ").
219. Terrence Chorvat, Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 35, 43 (2005); see
also Colin F. Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Predicting Human Behavior in Strategic
Situations, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 374, 378 (Camerer ed., 2004)
(summarizing trust games).
220. Chorvat, supra note 219, at 55.
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person's co-workers or peers are engaged in the illegal behavior. 2 2 1 The
behavioral economics literature may shed light on what impact
membership in such trade groups has on that individual's behavior in
that group.
Consequently, uncritical reliance on the Merger Guidelines' HHI
concentration levels may lead to false negatives. More empirical
research is needed across industries to determine the relationship of
concentration levels (and changes thereto as a result of mergers) to the
likelihood of tacit or express collusion.
3. Assumption That Even in Highly Concentrated Markets,
Anticompetitive Effects Are Unlikely Absent Certain Economic
Conditions That Facilitate Collusion
Under the Merger Guidelines, the agencies typically consider various
economic conditions that in theory facilitate collusion, such as product
or firm homogeneity, stability of technology, existence of maverick
sellers, capacity constraints, elasticity of demand, lumpiness of
purchases, and stability or predictability of demand conditions. 22 2 To
illustrate its point, this article addresses one factor, namely, buyers with
sufficient clout to deter the exercise of market power.
Merging parties frequently argue that their customers would
discipline any attempt to exercise market power. Big buyers, such as
Wal-Mart, Target, Costco, and Home Depot, arguably would secure a
competitive price by committing a greater volume of sales for a longer
time to those suppliers who offer the lowest price. Other incentives
may include favorable product placement (such as a retailer awarding an
end cap for a promotion) or more shelf space. If this fails, the big buyer
could sponsor entry by enticing the prospective entrant with such
favorable commitments. Thus, the Merger Guidelines and courts
recognize that although not determinative, the sophistication and
bargaining power of buyers play a "significant role" in assessing the

221. Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and
Internalizationas Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325, 329 (1980);
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 354-55
(1997) (stating that individuals' decisions to commit crimes are responsive to decisions of other

individuals and not just the price of the crime).
222.

See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 2.1.

560
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effects of a proposed transaction. 223 The FTC noted that it would22rarely
4
challenge a merger absent significant complaints from customers.
But at times, customers may give conflicting statements to counsel
for the merging parties and government. 22 5
Moreover, in the
government's two recent attempts to enjoin a merger, the district court
226
discounted the concerns by the government's customer witnesses.
These customers, of course, are not beyond biases.
Customers
conceivably could suffer from biases similar to those discussed in the
behavioral economics literature, but dissimilar from the theoretical
profit-maximizer. Consequently, how often do the customers accurately
predict the likelihood of a merger's anticompetitive effects, and their
ability to defeat the exercise of such market power?
The Department of Justice's experience with criminal price-fixing
prosecution, as Kolasky observed, suggests that
the ability of large sophisticated buyers to defeat cartel activity may be
overrated. In merger analysis, some assume that large purchasers in
the market will provide sufficient discipline to prevent cartels. Our
experience shows to the contrary that many successful cartels sell to
large, sophisticated buyers. In the lysine cartel, the buyers included
Tysons Foods and Con Agra; in citric acid, the buyers included CocaCola and Procter & Gamble; and in graphite electrodes, the victims
included every major steel producer in the world. What is particularly
ironic is that the perpetrators and victims of the citric acid cartel
included some of the very same firms that the district court found were
unlikely to engage in or be vulnerable to cartel activity in refusing to
enjoin an acquisition by ADM of one of its leading rivals in the high
fructose corn syrup market back in 1991.227
Likewise, the court may overstate the significance of the big buyer.
For example, in 1991, a federal district court rejected the government's
challenge to Archer-Daniels-Midland's ("ADM") long-term lease
agreement with a competitor because ADM's customers purportedly
had sufficient strength and leverage to thwart a price hike. 2 28 Several
223. FTC v. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 58 (D.D.C. 1998), quoting R.R. Donnelley &
Sons Co., No. 90-1619 SSH, 1990 WL 193674, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 1990); see also Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 2.12 (discussing factors involved in assessing the effects
of a proposed transaction).
224. TRANSPARENCY, supra note 188, at 24-25.
225. See United States v. Sunguard Data Sys., 172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 192 n.23 (D.D.C. 2001).
226. FTC v. Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 145-46 (D.D.C. 2004); United States v. Oracle
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1131, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2004). See also FTC v. Tenet Health Care

Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999) (questioning customers' testimony when inconsistent
with their economic interests).
227. Kolasky, supra note 199, at 18-19.
228. United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1416, 1423 (S.D. Iowa
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years later, however, in its criminal lysine price-fixing action against
ADM, the Department of Justice showed a secretly taped meeting where
ADM's President summarized his company's attitude toward its
customers. As one ADM cartel member told a senior executive from
his largest competitor: "Our competitors are our friends. Our customers
2 29
are the enemy."
At times, the big buyers may be overconfident of their negotiating
prowess to defeat post-merger any non-cost-based price hike. In
addition, these buyers' responses might be contingent on how the issue
is framed. For example, are the big buyers genuinely concerned about
protecting their customers, and would they resist any non-cost-based
wholesale price increase by the merging parties? Or might they accept a
supra-competitive wholesale price, if that price was lower relative to the
wholesale prices offered to their competitor retailers?
On the other hand, rational choice theory could lead to false
positives, in assuming that if a profit-maximizer could raise prices, so
too would the merging companies. In my experience, senior executives
often raise different reasons why they would not raise prices, even if
given the opportunity. The typical response is that even if these
executives were sincere, they could be replaced by profit-maximizers
(in the event of death, acquisition, shareholder revolt, etc.) who would
raise prices. The merger law-section 7 of Clayton Act-deals with a
"reasonable likelihood of a substantial lessening of competition," and
the possession of such market power would create such a probability,
even though the company executives assure that it would not be
exercised.2 3 °
But the Merger Guidelines may miss at times an important industry
dynamic. As the behavioral economics literature discusses, firms may
be disinclined to raise prices opportunistically for various reasons,
including the implications of short-run profit gains on long-term
profitability, or perhaps non-economic reasons such as fairness or
customer loyalty. 2 3 1 Although some antitrust economists are agnostic
on price discrimination or believe that in certain instances it may be

1991); see also United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 679 (D. Minn.
1990) (noting customers' ability to defeat a price hike).
229. HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 204, at 16. For a fascinating account of this
conspiracy and the events leading up to the trial, see KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT
(2000).
230. FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1072 (D.D.C. 1997) (quoting FTC v. Great Lakes
Chem. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. 111.1981)).
231. Kahneman et al., supra note 75, at 735 (discussing surveyed individuals' adverse
reaction to grocery store raising prices when its competitor is temporarily forced to close).
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pro-competitive, ninety-one percent of individuals in one survey
thought such exploitation by charging higher prices to those who are
more dependent on the product was offensive. 2 32 So even though firms
could raise prices or price discriminate, some may decline, so as to not

offend their customers. Obviously many companies do not share these
sensitivities when fixing prices, engaging in other anticompetitive
conduct, and amassing hefty profits at the consumers' expense. But it is
unclear how frequently merged entities behave like their profitmaximizing counterparts by the means suggested by the Merger

Guidelines, namely, raising prices by a small but significant amount.
Aside from issues of fairness, a company may have a long-term
The Merger
strategic interest in developing customer loyalty.
Guidelines assume that firms compete primarily on price, which for
certain industries may be true. But in commercial industries involving

customized business-to-business services or products, this may not
always hold true. Companies may seek to compete on parameters other
than price by offering value-added services. Suppliers, for example,

may

integrate

with their

customers

by providing

customized

manufactured products or services, or customized delivery mechanisms
(such as handling the customers' order placements and tracking their

inventory for just-in-time delivery).

The supplier and customer may

jointly collaborate on new products, technologies or services. The value
of these additional services may not be readily reflected in the supplier's
price. For example, electronic parts distributor Wesco Distribution,
according to a recent business article, devoted significant energy to
232. Id. at 735. As the former FTC Chairman recognized, more empirical analysis of pricediscrimination is necessary:
Some lawyers and economists use evidence of "price discrimination" to infer market
power and market definition, raising several issues. Most real world markets, even
those for relatively "homogenous" products and a market structure inconsistent with
significant market power, exhibit significant price variation. These price differences do
not prove that the firms have market power. Moreover, price discrimination can be procompetitive. A significant deficiency of the economics literature is the fragmentary
explanation of why significant price variation is common and understanding the
implications of this fact.
A related issue occurs when the agency learns of customers concerned about targeted
price increases. These concerns are difficult to assess, especially without detailed
industry data. Greater focus on techniques to evaluate and analyze transaction data will
yield insights into the likelihood of potential anticompetitive pricing. Thus, more
research is needed concerning how to identify price discrimination that raises
competitive concerns and the role that price discrimination should have in merger
analysis.
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, remarks at George Mason University
Law Review's Winter Antitrust Symposium (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/muris/improveconfoundatio.htm.

2007]

Behavioral Economists at the Gate

building customer loyalty by offering inventory management and
energy audits. 23 3
By integrating their procurement and supply
processes with Wesco's systems, the customers lowered their costs of
procuring components and operating these electrical systems. 234 To
maximize their cost savings, the customers committed more volume to
Wesco, which, as a result, reduced Wesco's costs. 23 5 Wesco thereafter
passed on some of these cost savings to its customers. 2 36 The focus
then is not how much the bundled products and services cost the client;
rather, it is how much they saved the client overall. Given the time and
expense to build such consumer loyalty, the strategic implications of
raising the customers' switching costs, and the competitive advantage
such loyalty building may provide, it may be irrational for the merging
parties to fritter this away with an unjustified cost increase (simply
because an opportunistic profit-maximizing firm would do so).
Consequently more empirical research is necessary as to market
conditions that are conducive to the exercise of market power. For
example, when were the large, sophisticated purchasers successful or
unsuccessful in preventing the exercise of market power post-merger?
Conversely, did companies, post-merger, which in theory could raise
prices opportunistically, do so?
4. Assumption That Anticompetitive Effects Are Unlikely Unless Entry
Barriers Are Sufficiently High
The Chicago School's antitrust theories treat entrants as the
superheroes of consumer welfare. When companies attempt to reduce
output and raise prices, profit-maximizing entrants or fringe market
participants should swoop in and restore competition. In defining
barriers as a cost that differentially affects new entrants compared to
market participants, 237 significant entry barriers, for some Chicago
School adherents, rarely exist. 2 38 When they do, one significant culprit
is the regulatory government. 2 39 At other times, these entry barriers are
233. Das Narayandas, Building Loyalty in Business Markets, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept. 2005, at
131,138-39.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Posner, supra note 33, at 945 (citing GEORGE STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY 67-70 (1968)).

238. Id. at 946.
239. "It is well known," said Judge Kozinski in Syufy, "that some of the most insuperable
barriers in the great race of competition are the result of government regulation. Regulation often
helps entrench existing businesses by placing new entrants at a competitive disadvantage.'" Judge
Kozinski provided one example, namely government lawsuits. United States v. Syufy Enterp.,
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justified, in enabling an innovator, through its patent, to recoup its
investment. Thus, enforcers should intercede only in those narrow
circumstances where antitrust's kryptonite (high entry barriers) would
thwart these profit-maximizing superheroes from entering or expanding
in the markets. 2 40 The Merger Guidelines have a slightly more
expansive view of entry barriers. In markets where entry would in
theory be timely (less than two years), likely, and sufficient in its
magnitude, character, and scope to deter the exercise of market power,
then the "merger raises no antitrust concern and ordinarily requires no
further analysis." 24 1 If entry would be deficient on any of the three
parameters (timeliness, likelihood, or sufficiency), then the Guidelines
presume that the profit-maximizing entrant would not defeat the
Entry barriers are
exercise of market power post-merger. 24 2
consequently a key factor under the Merger Guidelines analysis. 24 3 In
analyzing its mergers subject to a Second Request between fiscal years
1996 and 2003, the FTC observed that it took no enforcement action
where the staff concluded that entry would24 4be timely, likely and
sufficient under the Merger Guidelines criteria.
Even if the federal antitrust agencies believe entry barriers are
sufficiently high, the courts may disagree. The courts have adopted the
view that in the absence of significant entry barriers, a company
probably cannot maintain supra-competitive pricing for any length of
24 5
time.
But do these profit-maximizing superheroes indeed defeat market
power in industries with moderate to low entry barriers? Since pricefixing and bid-rigging are per se illegal, the Department of Justice need

903 F.2d 659, 673 (9th Cir. 1990).
240. POSNER, supra note 6, at 127, 141.
241. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 3.0.
242. Id.
243. Scheffman et al., supra note 124, at 301.
244. See TRANSPARENCY, supra note 188, at 78 (noting that of the nineteen cases identified,
sixteen were in highly concentrated industries (post-merger HHI exceeding 1800)).
245. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119-20 n.15 (1986) (recognizing that
"[w]ithout barriers to entry into the market it would presumably be impossible to maintain
supracompetitive prices for an extended time."); United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d
976, 983 (2d Cir. 1984) (easy entry would eliminate any anticompetitive impact of merger in
highly concentrated industry); United States v. Syufy Enter., 903 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1990)
("If there are no significant barriers to entry... any attempt to raise prices above the competitive
level will lure into the market new competitors able and willing to offer their commercial goods
or personal services for less."); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 54-55 (D.D.C.
1998) (finding that ease of entry can be sufficient to offset the government's prima facie case of
anticompetitiveness).
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not, and generally does not, address the characteristics of the industry,
such as HIs or entry barriers. A review of the Department of Justice's
criminal antitrust cases brought between 1988 and 1996 reveals price-

fixing and bid-rigging in industries that superficially appear to have
high entry barriers, such as commercial explosives 246 (which has
regulatory and licensing barriers) and thermal facsimile paper. 247 But
many industries, which appear on the surface to have moderate or low
entry barriers, were also susceptible to price-fixing, such as:
turtles;

2 48

24 9
low-priced carpets sold throughout the United States;
2 50
plastic cups and glasses;

the interstate
transportation
51
2

of household goods for military

personnel;
25 2
chain link fences;
253
retail gasoline;
the sale of wholesale plumbing supplies;254
255
new steel pails;
25 6
bicycle retailers;
2 57
one brand of boats;

246. United States v. ICI Explosives USA Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH) 45,095,
at 44,758 (D. Tex. 1995).
247. United States v. Kanzaki Specialty Papers, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH)
45,094, at 44,706 (D. Mass. 1994).
248. United States v. National Turtle Farmers & Shippers Assoc., Inc., Trade Reg. Rep.
Summaries (CCH) 45,095, at 44,744 (D. La. 1995).
249. United States v. Sunrise Carpet Indus., Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH)
45,095, at 44,750 (D. Ga. 1995).
250. United States v. Plastics, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH) 45,094, at 44,696
(E.D. Pa. 1994).
251. United States v. Austin Moving & Storage Co., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH)
45,089, at 44,459 (D. Fla. 1989).
252. United States v. Davis Walker Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH) 45,080, at
44,229 (D. Md. 1988).
253. United States v. Appalachian Oil Co., Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH) 45,091,
at 44,571 (D. Tenn. 1991) (showing price-fixing between 1980 and 1988 in Johnson City.
Tennessee).
254. United States v. Robert David Smith, Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH) 45,093, at
44,633 (D. Tex. 1993).
255. United States v. Van Leer Containers, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH) 45,092,
at 44,592 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
256. United States v. Michael J. Wolf, Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH)
45,094, at
44,700 (D. Conn. 1994).
257. United States v. Mo. River Marine, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH) 45,091, at
44,563 (D. Mont. 1991) (showing price-fixing and market and customer allocation).
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buyers of waste paper from sources

such

as

supermarkets,

warehouses, newspaper publishers and then reselling to other dealers or
paper mills; 258 and

259
residential roofing work.
Similarly, bid-rigging occurred in many local markets, which on the
surface appear to have minimal entry barriers. Some, as noted below,
involved public auctions, which presumably were open to all:

demolition contracts;260
26 1
waterproofing and building restoration;
262
contracts for scrap metal from industrial plants;
2 63
purchase of used sewing machines at public auctions;
264
purchase of antiques at public auctions;

2 65
purchase of jewelry at public auctions;
266
real estate at public auctions;
26 7
rare banknotes;
purchase of used commercial equipment at public auctions; 2 68 and
26 9
highway pavement marking contracts.

258. United States v. I. Hershman & Co., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH) 45,091, at
44,559 (D. Conn. 1991).
259. United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH) 45,088, at
44,420 (D. Kan. 1989); United States v. Comox Constr., Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH)
45,090, at 44,519 (D. Kan. 1991) (allocating customers for installation of residential cedar
shake roofs over ten-year period).
260. United States v. James Karis, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH)
45,088, at
44,413-5 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
261. United States v. Silverman, Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH)
45,093, at 44,655
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
262. United States v. George Apkin & Sons, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH)
45,093, at 44,662 (D. Mass. 1993).
263. United States v. Ace Sewing Mach. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH) 45,089, at
44,481 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
264. United States v. Kay & Gross, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH) 45,091, at
44,545 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. Empire Antiques Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries
(CCH) 45,092, at 44,601 (D. Mass. 1992).
265. United States v. John G. Bares, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH) 45,090, at
44,499 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
266. United States v. Greenbaum, Trade Reg. Reporter: Rep. (CCH)
45,090, at 44,511
(D.D.C. 1990) (showing bid-rigging at real estate auctions between 1977 and 1986).
267. United States v. William Barrett Numismatics Ltd., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH)
45,095, at 44,741 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
268. United States v. Libsons Mach., Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH) 45,089, at
44,459 (D.R.I. 1989).
269. United States v. Accent Stripe, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH)
45,092, at
44,615 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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As these criminal prosecutions reveal, markets characterized with
low entry barriers are susceptible to price-fixing. In criticizing a
Supreme Court decision, Posner, for example, surmised that collusion
would not be feasible in the supermarket industry given its low entry
barriers. The Reagan Administration, in fact, prosecuted price-fixing in
this industry. 270 As Kolasky noted in 2002:
while most of our cartel cases involve industries in which entry tends
to be difficult, there are notable exceptions, such as in the Division's
many bid rigging cases in the road building industry. The road
building industry, at least at the time of the conspiracies, 27was
not
1
difficult to enter, yet the Division turned up numerous cartels.
Some industries bore conspiracies over the history of the Sherman
Act. In rejecting the government's challenge of a merger, a district
court surmised that the "absence of entry barriers makes it unlikely that
these sellers of fluid milk could exercise market power." 272 But
approximately one week after the Department of Justice challenged this
merger between fluid milk processors in one state, a fluid milk supplier
in another state pled guilty to bid-rigging on milk contracts for schools
and federal military installations, bringing to date a total of eighty-three
criminal cases filed against forty-seven corporations and fifty-six
individuals in the fluid milk/dairy products industry for bid-rigging
conspiracies in Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Virginia, Kentucky, Illinois, Texas, Mississippi, Tennessee, Indiana and
Oklahoma. 27 3 Moreover, in 1992, Oak Grove Dairy (one of the profitmaximizing competitors referenced in Country Lake) was indicted for
entering into and engaging in a combination and conspiracy to suppress
and eliminate competition by fixing prices, rigging bids, and allocating
customers with respect to public school contracts for the sale of dairy
products in the State of Minnesota. 274 Besides fluid milk and dairy

270. Compare POSNER, supra note 6, at 127 (noting that the Los Angeles grocery stores in
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) could not have fixed prices without
inducing rapid and widespread entry as to force the market price down to competitive levels
before the cartel could obtain substantial monopoly profits) with United States v. Waldbaum, Inc.,
612 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Conn. 1985).
271. Kolasky, supra note 199, at 20-21.
272. United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 673 (D. Minn. 1990).
273. See United States v. Borden, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries (CCH)
45,090, at
44,495 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
274. United States v. George Benz & Sons, Inc. d/b/a Oak Grove Dairy, Criminal No. 97-134
(D. Minn. 1997). As of August 1993, the Division had brought ninety-eight criminal cases
against fifty-two corporations and sixty-six individuals in the milk and dairy products industry for
bid-rigging conspiracies. See United States v. H. Meyer Dairy Co., Trade Reg. Rep. Summaries

(CCH) 45,093, at 44,649. As of August 1993, 45 corporations and 48 individuals had been
convicted, and approximately $46.3 million in fines were imposed. Id.
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products, other industries such as gypsum board, bread, cement,
fertilizers, trucking, and lumber have had a higher degree of
27 5
recidivism.
Moreover, while the Chicago School posits that cartels are inherently
unstable, 276 many conspiracies, including those with eleven or more
conspirators, last for long periods. 2 77 As Kolasky said:
[c]artels are more durable [than] sometimes thought. After the ADM
plea, the Wall Street Journal stated 'If colluders push prices too high,
defectors and new entrants will set things right.' Our experience has
shown that this is not the case. Several of the cartels we prosecuted
had been in existence for over ten years, including one (sorbates) that
lasted 17 years, from 1979 to 1996.278
275. An earlier review identified over forty defendants who faced four or more indictments
and convictions for antitrust offenses between July 1955 and 1980. JAMES M. CLABAULT &
MICHAEL K. BLOCK, SHERMAN ACT INDICTMENTS: 1955-1980, at 905-11 (1981). Among those
criminally convicted for multiple antitrust violations during this twenty-five-year period were:
General Electric Co. (nineteen antitrust convictions); Westinghouse Electric Corp. (twenty); oil
producers Gulf Oil Corp. (six); Phillips Petroleum Co. (seven); Shell Oil Co. (seven); Mobil Oil
Corp. (eleven); and steel producers Bethlehem Steel Corp. (seven) and United States Steel Corp.
(eleven). As the former Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division said, the DOJ files
"contain the stories of industries that seem again and again to have had antitrust difficulty" and
that corporate recidivism "is not at all unknown in the antitrust world." John H. Shenefield,
Compliance Programs As Viewed from the Antitrust Division, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 79 (1979).
Another example was Hoffmann-La Roche, which continued its participation in the vitamin
conspiracy even as it was entering into a plea agreement for its participation in the citric acid
cartel. Kolasky, supra note 199, at 20.
276. See Posner, supra note 33, at 932 (noting early neoclassical economic belief, in which
the Chicago School operates, that cartels are highly unstable); John S. McGee, Ocean Freight
Rate Conferences and the American Merchant Marine, 27 U. CH. L. REV. 191, 197-99 (1960).
277. The average duration of price fixing and other per se illegal cartels prosecuted by the
United States between 1955-59 was 7.4 years. Gallo et al., supra note 110, at 99. The average
length of the conspiracies prosecuted in the four-year periods thereafter ranged between 6.2 and
7.8 years. Id. During the Reagan Administration, the Division prosecuted more regional
conspiracies, and fewer nationwide or international conspiracies. Id. The average duration of the
conspiracies during the Reagan Administration was also shorter: 3.7 years (1980-84); 4 years
(1985-89). Id. The average duration of conspiracies prosecuted thereafter was 5.8 years (199094), and 2.6 years for two-year period of 1995-97. Id. As Posner observed from his study of
prosecuted cartels, the hypothesis that cartels with more members are less stable than cartels with
fewer members "yielded a negative result." Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust
Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 402 (1970). Of the seventy-nine conspiracies involving ten
or fewer conspirators, fifty-two percent of them (forty-one) persisted for six years or more, and
twenty-four percent lasted more than ten years. Id. Of the twenty-eight conspiracies involving
eleven or more conspirators, sixty-four percent of them (eighteen) persisted for six years or more,
and thirty-two percent lasted more than ten years. Id. See also Simon J. Evenett, Margaret C.
Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s,
WORLD ECON. 1221, 1226 (2001) (average duration of surveyed cartels prosecuted in 1990s was
six years, with some lasting two decades).
278. Kolasky, supra note 199, at 19 (emphasis omitted). Likewise, former Assistant Attorney
General Joel Klein remarked:
Another great myth, perpetrated by some of the theoretical thinkers is that cartels,
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At other times, entry occurs but fails to prevent the price-fixing. The
entrant is either ineffectual or co-opted. The Antitrust Division's top
criminal

prosecutor observed of one enterprising criminal cartel

involving thirty-one individuals and fifteen companies prosecuted for
massive bid-rigging among food suppliers. In defrauding New York
City schools, children's facilities, homeless shelters, hospitals, and jails,
among other non-profit and public entities, the bid-riggers went beyond
"the usual agreements on price levels and allocations of contracts" but

also had "a slush fund totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars, which
was used to pay off potential competitors to bid high, or not to bid at all,
279
on contract solicitations that other conspirators were slated to win."

On the other hand, studies have shown companies entering markets

when rational choice theory predicts the contrary. A profit-maximizing
firm would not embark on such ventures with a negative expected
value. 280 Examining entry on a macro level (domestic manufacturing

industries), one antitrust commentator found that twenty-five percent of
these entrants disappear within two years, and over sixty percent within

five years. 281 Thus, while entry was not difficult, survival was. Why

then does entry occur, where it should not, and why doesn't timely,
likely and sufficient entry always occur in markets where under the

Merger Guidelines it should?
The behavioral finance literature may offer some insights. In theory,
entry in the form of arbitrage should be very attractive in financial
markets since: (i) entry involves no sunk cost (just the opportunity cost

of using the funds elsewhere), (ii) the financial markets have greater
price transparency and asset liquidity than in many other markets (such

where they exist, are unstable and short-lived. Our experience proves otherwise. The
Division has uncovered a number of conspiracies that operated for a decade or more,
and the majority of the international cartels that we have prosecuted or that are
currently under investigation are believed to have already existed continuously for 510 years or longer. In each of the cases that I just mentioned, you can bet that the
cartels would still exist today if they had not been detected and prosecuted by the
Division.
Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Remarks at the American Bar Association Antitrust
Section Spring Meeting: The Antitrust Division's International Anti-Cartel Enforcement Program
(Apr. 6, 2006).
279. Scott D. Hammond, Director of Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust Division, A Review of
Recent Cases and Developments in the Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program,
presented at the 2002 Antitrust Conference: Antitrust Issues In Today's Economy By The
Conference Board (Mar. 7, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
10862.htm.
280. Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality,Market Discipline, and Legal
Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 489-90 (2002).
281. Id.at490.
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as real estate), and (iii) such "an investment strategy ... offers riskless
profits at no cost." 282 The Efficient Market Hypothesis consequently
assumes that such easy entry would readily exploit arbitrage
opportunities, and move stock prices back to their true value. If so, why
then are arbitrageurs at times slow in exploiting such opportunities (or
do not exploit them all)? One possible explanation is that despite the
price transparency of stocks, the costs of discovering such arbitrage
opportunities are greater than generally assumed under the Efficient
Market Hypothesis. 28 3 If so, then the search costs for potential entrants
to ascertain market prices and/or the cost of entry would presumably be
greater in other markets with far less price transparency. Restrictions
on trading could be another explanation. It could also be that the
number of superheroes is limited, and the discounted return on capital
for other ventures simply is more attractive.
Another explanation may be the role of the biases discussed in the
behavioral economics literature. Any meaningful entry requires some
degree of adventure and risk. Entry first depends upon the company's
willingness to explore new markets, technologies, or products. Not only
are there search costs for discovering such opportunities, the motivation
may also depend on the conditions in the potential entrant's current
2 84
market.
Once the company identifies the opportunity, entry next depends
upon its willingness to exploit that opportunity. The way individuals
perceive and react to either risk and/or uncertainty may systemically
diverge from the rational choice theory's predicted outcome.
Individuals generally are more risk adverse with respect to gains than
losses. For example, in one study, a majority of test subjects preferred a
sure gain (for example, a $50 reward) to a gamble (fifty percent
probability of winning $100).285 However, the same test subjects were
more willing to gamble a loss (opting for the fifty percent chance of

282. Barberis & Thaler, supra note 62, at 3-4.
283. Stout, supra note 99, at 655-65.
284. See BEINHOCKER, supra note 2, at 254-58 (discussing RICHARD FOSTER, INNOVATION:
THE ATTACKER'S ADVANTAGE (1986)). From various industries, Foster found a consistent Sshaped curve pattern involving the natural life cycle of technologies. Initially, a technology's
performance is poor, and progress is slow. After a period of investment and refinement, the
technology takes off, and each dollar invested yields substantial gains from the technology. As
the technology matures, its returns on investment diminish, and entrepreneurs and smaller
innovators have an increased incentive to explore for new technologies. Thus, a company where
its technology is in the growth stage may be more willing to exploit current opportunities (such as
by expanding in other geographic markets) than to invest in future disruptive technologies. Id.
285. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1105.
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paying a $100 fine), than paying a certain penalty ($50 fine). 2 86 Studies
also show that professional traders are susceptible to these heuristics

and biases. 287 Similarly, once an entrant has taken the plunge, it may
more likely accept a greater risk (such as investing more money to
remain in the market if there is a fifty percent probability of attaining a
$100 million in profits) than if the company is still on the edge
considering whether to enter and commit those funds. 28 8 With respect
to ambiguous risks (where not all the risks are known or the risks'
probability of occurring is unknown), the behavioral economists have
2 89
found that the test subjects are even more risk averse.
The timeliness, likelihood, and success of entry may depend on
organizational behavior. Ideally, the larger the company, the greater the
degree of possibilities to exploit the opportunity. Organizational growth
can create powerful economies of scale to tackle more complex tasks
such as making a jumbo jet airplane versus a caf6 americano. 290 But
such "network growth creates interdependencies, interdependencies
create conflicting constraints, and conflicting constraints create slow

286. Id.
287. Prentice, supra note 2, at 1704 n.21 1.
288. Although under rational choice theory, the profit-maximizer should not be affected by
sunk costs in its decisions (such as feeling obligated to go to the theatre on a particular night, after
purchasing a season subscription), studies show such sunk cost effects influence decision-making.
See Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, supra note 71, at 83-86; Prentice, supra note 2, at 1735
n.385.
289. Colin F. Camerer & Risto Karjalainen, Ambiguity-Aversion and Non-additive Beliefs in
Non-cooperative Games: Experimental Evidence, in MODELS AND EXPERIMENTS ON RISK AND
RATIONALITY 325, 325-58 (Bertrand Munier & Mark Machina eds., 1994). While a Special
Assistant U.S. Attorney, I observed this phenomenon (although the results can hardly be
described as scientific). As part of our training, we prosecuted traffic infractions on the George
Washington Memorial Parkway, which was federal land, and thus within the federal court's
jurisdiction. Given the number of speeding infractions on the weekly docket, we would on the
morning of the court date attempt to negotiate pleas with the defendants. Pleas were important, as
trying these cases would consume much of the court's resources. The United States Park Police
officer would write on the ticket the infraction (speeding and reckless driving) and the fine.
Initially, despite my offer to drop one of the infractions (reckless driving) (thus providing
indirectly a benefit of lower insurance premiums), many defendants on my docket were unwilling
to plea and opted for the trial (taking a gamble on paying nothing rather than the fine on the
ticket). I then offered as part of the plea to lower the speed (thus lowering the points that the local
DMV assessed on the ticket) but that did not significantly increase the number of pleas. Still
puzzled, I observed some of my fellow SAUSAs, and then added to my plea speech a degree of
ambiguity. I noted to the speeder that the judge was not bound by the amount of fine reflected on
the ticket (which was true), and that the court could impose up to the maximum penalties for this
misdemeanor, namely 6 months imprisonment and/or a fine up to $5,000. I indicated that
although these maximum fines were rarely imposed, I needed to make the defendant aware of this
possibility. The number of pleas skyrocketed.
290. BEINHOCKER, supra note 2, at 148-50.
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decision making and, ultimately, bureaucratic gridlock."-29 1 As one has
likely experienced planning a family event with parents, siblings, inlaws, and relatives, the more interaction and approval required, the
lesser the degree of freedom, and the greater the likelihood of standing
in a parking lot arguing over which restaurant would be suitable for all.
Because companies' culture and hierarchy may vary considerably,
one empirical question is how does the potential entrant internally
promote risk taking? Television and radio advertisements commonly
tout their products as the safe choice for the middle-manager: "No one
was ever fired for using . . . ." As the behavioral economics literature
illustrates, if the mid-level executives evaluated each project
individually and separately (rather than collectively), such "narrow
framing" may lead to greater risk aversion. Thaler, for example, asked
one firm's twenty-five executives if they would undertake a project that
stood a fifty percent chance to gain $2 million and fifty percent chance
to lose $1 million. 2 92 Only three executives accepted the gamble,
whereas the company's CEO, when asked if would like a portfolio of
twenty-five of these investments, nodded enthusiastically. 29 3 On the
other hand, the company may internally place a premium on such risk
taking, encouraging its departments to consider alternative strategies as
a hedging mechanism.
Economists then can use data from other fields, such as
organizational
behavior and social psychology, to identify
characteristics (either of industries or firm structures) where all else is
equal (under the Merger Guidelines), entry is more (rather than less)
likely to occur on a timely basis and be sufficient to defeat the exercise
of market power. Although in evaluating mergers, antitrust enforcers
look at instances of past entry, the harder question is whether the change
in the market as a result of this merger alters the dynamics of entry. A
company may be more committed to expend resources to remain in the
market than to expend to enter. Only by re-examining the market postmerger can one determine whether these superheroes did in fact
materialize and defeat the merger's anticompetitive effects.

291. Id. at 152.
292. Thaler, supra note 71, at 97.
293. Id.
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5. Assumption That Many Companies Merge to
Generate Significant Efficiencies
The Merger Guidelines state that the "primary benefit of mergers to
the economy is their efficiency-enhancing potential. 29 4 The belief is
that profit-maximizing firms merge for two principal reasons:
efficiencies/cost savings and/or market power. If the merger generates
neither, it would be economically irrational.
The Merger Guidelines treat efficiencies as a defense available for
the merging parties. The parties may argue that the merger will generate
efficiencies, which, in turn, will lead to lower prices for consumers. 295
Efficiencies that reduce marginal costs in theory could make collusion
less likely or effective by "creating a new maverick firm." Some have
argued for expanding the availability of the efficiencies defense to
mergers where consumers would likely pay higher prices, but where the
merging parties would yield even greater productive efficiencies (the
cost savings attributable to the merger). 29 6 Under this total welfare
standard, society would be better off since the merged entity would
consume fewer resources, which would be freed up for other
consumers.

297

The problem is that no one knows whether, and to what extent,
mergers in different industries actually generate significant efficiencies.
Management consulting firms, for example, have noted that the merging
parties' executives, at times, may overstate the likely efficiencies. 29 8 In
several notable cases, such as the AOL/Time Warner merger, the parties
failed to achieve their claimed efficiencies. 29 9 In the antitrust field,
some, including economist F.M. Scherer, have their doubts:
294. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 4. For a well-written account of the
evolution of the efficiencies defense, see William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger
Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 207 (2003).
295. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 4.
296. Posner, supra note 33, at 930-35. For a discussion of the varying efficiency defenses,
including the consumer welfare and total welfare standards, see Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T.
Kudrle, Rhetoric and Reality in the Merger Standards of the United States, Canada, and the
European Union, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 423 (2005).
297. Some Chicago School adherents, however, do not subscribe to an efficiencies defense,
given the difficulty in calculating efficiencies. POSNER, supra note 6, at 133. They instead
believe that most efficiency-enhancing mergers, if the government agencies apply the Chicago
School's rational choice theories, would go unchallenged. Id. at 133-34.
298. For a summary of various management consulting studies, see Paul A. Pautler, The
Effects of Mergers and Post-merger Integration: A Review of Business Consulting Literature
(Jan. 21, 2003), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/be/rt/businesreviewpaper.pdf.
299. Steve Case, It's Time to Take It Apart: My Case for Dividing the Media Giant, WASH.
POST, Dec. 11, 2005, at B 1.
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What the combination of this evidence seems to reveal is that making
mergers is a risky proposition. Many mergers, and perhaps the
majority, fail to live up to expectations and may indeed make matters
worse rather than better. Many muddle though. A fair number
succeed, and a few succeed spectacularly ....

Making mergers is a

skill matters, but there is an important chance
form of gambling;
30 0
component.
In cases where efficiencies were not realized, why did the corporate
executives misjudge? The acquiring company, for example, may have
had incomplete information on the acquired company (due in part to the
antitrust laws) when they calculated pre-merger the likely efficiencies.
Other non-quantifiable or unforeseen factors (such as the two
organizations' cultures or a downturn in the economy) may have
materially impeded the realization of such efficiencies.
It is also possible that the biases discussed in the behavioral
economics literature account for the executives' poor predictions on
efficiencies. Rational choice theory assumes that bidders are profitmaximizers, and each bidder assumes that the other bidders are rational.
But in bidding wars, passion and optimism may prevail, leading the
participants to overvalue the purchased assets. The greater the number
of bidders, as Thaler points out, the greater the risk of overpaying for
the assets-the winner's curse. 30 1 Even if one bidder recognizes that its
competitors' bids are inflated, it can either opt out of the bid (but if the
winner's curse behavior is systemic, this may not be an optimal strategy
long-term) or attempt to outbid the other bids. 30 2 Alternatively, fueled
by their successes with prior mergers, corporate executives may be
overconfident in their management skills, and believe (just as the belief
in the athlete with the hot hand) 30 3 that the next merger would yield
similar (if not greater) efficiencies. Or management's incentives for
merging may be driven, not by market power or efficiencies, but by
30 4
handsome buy-out compensation packages.
It is difficult today for outsiders to measure ex post whether the
Many public
merger actually yielded the claimed efficiencies.
companies report on a consolidated basis, so one may not easily
measure the post-merger cost savings for a particular division.

300.
REv. 5,
301.
302.
303.
304.

F.M. Scherer, Some Principlesfor Post-ChicagoAntitrust Analysis, 52 CASE W. RES. L.
18 (2001).
THALER, WINNER'S CURSE, supra note 62, at 50-62.
Id.
Prentice, supra note 2, at 1684 n.95 (citing articles on hot hand theory).
Gretchen Morgenson, What Are Mergers Good For?, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005, § 6

(Magazine), at 58.

2007]

Behavioral Economists at the Gate

Moreover, some cost savings may have been realized independent of the
merger (such as new management or technology). Even if one puts
aside the infirmities of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, comparing the
company's stock price pre- and post-merger raises other complications
when the efficiencies are small relative to overall earnings, or when
intervening factors materially impact the stock price. Relying on the
market's reaction to the announcement of the merger assumes that
market participants (with presumably less information than the
acquiring company's executives regarding the merging companies' cost
structures) were better prognosticators of the likely efficiencies than
company management. Moreover, the stock price may rise for reasons
unrelated to efficiencies (including anomalies in the market itself).
Given that antitrust enforcers do not regularly revisit mergers, it is
unclear today to what extent the efficiencies claimed as a defense
actually materialized. More empirical research is needed to determine
to what extent mergers generate significant efficiencies. Such research
may help identify factors of when, and under what circumstances, the
claimed efficiencies are likely to be realized.
D. Nature of the Problem
Antitrust agencies do not ignore empirical data. The staff generally
spends months during the pre-merger review process gathering industry
data through various sources, such as customers, competitors, and
market experts. The staff typically considers natural experiments, such
as market prices before and after recent entry or prices in other
geographic markets with one fewer competitor. 30 5 Some industries
offer unusually rich data, such as retailers' in-store scan data, which can
show what impact changes in the retail price of one brand (such as
Wonder white-pan bread) had on the unit sales of other branded or
private label products (such as rye bread, bagels, or wheat bread).30 6
305. For one such natural experiment where the analysis did not rest on functional
interchangeability of office products sold through different outlets, but rather on the localized
competition between the merging parties and the differences in pricing in geographic markets
when one faced competition with the other, see FFC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1073-81
(D.D.C. 1997).
306. See Daniel Hosken et al., Demand System Estimation and Its Application to Horizontal
Merger Analysis (Fed. Trade Comm'n Bureau of Economics, Working Paper No. 246, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp246.pdf (discussing use of scanner data for
demand estimation); David Scheffman & Mary Coleman, FTC Perspectives on the Use of
Econometric Analyses in Antitrust Cases (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/

ftcperspectivesoneconometrics.pdf (discussing the use of scanner data for demand estimation and
other relevant economic analyses); Fed. Trade Comm'n, Bureau of Economics, Best Practicesfor
Data, and Economics and FinancialAnalyses in Antitrust Investigations (2002), available at

http://www.ftc.gov/be/ftcbebp.pdf (providing guidelines on economic analysis for meeting with
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But even with this rich data, as former FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris
observed, the economic merger simulation models typically are based
on simple economic models, such as a "one-shot Bertrand" model.3 °7
One major problem then is that the "Bertrand model is imposed with
virtually no analysis of its actual ability to explain competition in the
market. Theory cannot perfectly replicate reality, but applying a highly
simplistic theory without any empirical basis that the theory adequately
approximates reality is not sound economics." 30 8 Thus, pre-merger,
months of hard work go into collecting data for these economic models,
but post-merger, the agencies typically do not revisit the industry to see
if their model got it right. As Kovacic observed, the "desirability of
devoting greater resources to ex post evaluation of completed matters
was a consistent theme of competition policy experts who testified at
the FTC's hearings in 1995 on innovation and international
309
competition."
The challenge for antitrust policy makers is apparent. In light of the
burgeoning behavioral economics literature and the anecdotal evidence
thus far, the government's descriptive theory, which makes several
critical assumptions based on industry structure and entry, needs to be
rigorously tested to determine its accuracy in predicting the likelihood
of competitive harm. 3 10 But this may be so self-evident that one may

FTC Bureau of Economics). See also Guidelines Commentary, supra note 148, at 6, 8, 9, 14
(describing use of scan data to estimate demand elasticities for branded consumer products).
307. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC, Remarks at George Mason University Law Review's
Winter Antitrust Symposium (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/

improveconfoundatio.htm.
308. Id.
309. William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments: Using Ex Post Assessments of
Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 843,
855-56, (2001) (collecting statements); see also Timothy J. Muris, GTE Sylvania and the
Empirical Foundations of Antitrust, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 906-07 (2001) (agencies should fill
merger policy's void by testing post-merger existence of anticompetitive effects); Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Empirical Industrial Organization Roundtable 115-41 (Sept. 11, 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/empiricalioroundtabletranscript.pdf (discussing the value of ex post

evaluation of mergers).
310.

Similarly, the former FTC Chairman recognized:

To assess the efficacy of merger enforcement, we need to analyze the effects of past
enforcement actions, including non-enforcement decisions. Specifically, we need to
understand the industry and firm specific conditions relevant to the potential for

anticompetitive effects. We also need to know much more about the nature and
likelihood of significant procompetitive effects of mergers. Understanding the
efficiencies that can arise from mergers and how they are achieved would provide us
with greater ability to evaluate prospective mergers.
Muris, supra note 307.
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ask: doesn't the government revisit these industries post-merger? The
3 11
answer is often no.
The FTC from time to time publishes studies of different industries,
such as the soft drink industry. 3 12
The Department of Justice
occasionally evaluates particular industries, most notably in the 1930s
when the congressional Temporary National Economic Committee
investigated the state of competition in various industries. As the
Justice Department later reported, this empirical analysis was helpful.
The factual data from this effort "revealed the urgent need for a
vigorous attack on monopoly power and concentration of economic
resources and gave added impetus in 1938 and subsequently to the
effort to reverse or at least check the trend toward concentration which
had prevailed for most of the preceding half century, and to overcome
3 13
some of the obstacles to effective enforcement of the antitrust laws."
From time to time, the agencies have proposed such ex post review to
provide "needed insight into the effectiveness of antitrust
enforcement, ' 3 14 but failed to undertake such action.
At times, the agencies may revisit that industry, but when is
indeterminate-perhaps because of another merger, a criminal pricefixing prosecution, or a monopolization case. It is also unpredictable
whether the staff will take any action if another merger occurs in an
industry. For example, if the agency previously investigated, but did
not challenge, a merger (because the product market was difficult to
defend under the Merger Guidelines or the industry's entry barriers
were deemed low), then the agency may pass on re-examining that
industry (even though no analysis was done as to what actually
happened to competition post-merger). This, in turn, may compound

311. Kovacic, supra note 309, at 852 ("Public enforcement agencies spend comparatively few
resources assessing the effect of their past initiatives."); Muris, supra note 307, at 906; GAO,
REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS: CLOSER CONTROLS AND BETTER DATA COULD IMPROVE
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, supra note 211, at 12 (noting that neither agency placed high priority
on evaluating enforcement activities to assure that resources are effectively employed).
312. Harold Saltzman et al., Transformationand Continuity: The U.S. CarbonatedSoft Drink
Bottling Industry and Antitrust Policy Since 1980 (Nov. 1999), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
softdrink/softdrink.pdf; Laurence Schumann et al., Case Studies of the Price Effects of Horizontal
Mergers (April 1992) (study examines aftermath of mergers in three industries: titanium dioxide,
cement, and corrugated paperboard, finding a mixture of results with likely pro-competitive
outcomes in cement and paperboard, and potentially large anticompetitive outcome in titanium
dioxide, depending on the model specification).
313. 1952 DOJ ANTITRUST REPORT, supra note 115, at 9.
314. GAO, REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS: CLOSER CONTROLS AND BETTER DATA COULD
IMPROVE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, supra note 211, at 13 (noting agencies' proposals to study
markets where a successful case was brought to determine effect on prices or for mergers whether
competition has been restored).
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the error. Even if the staff does investigate the next merger, the data
from the original investigation may have been destroyed, returned to the
parties, or gathering dust in archives. Even if the data reveals a price
increase after the last merger, the government may still hesitate. If the
higher prices are not readily explainable under current rational choice
theory, then the government may pass on that merger as well. The
government may also be hindered in legally challenging the
anticompetitive conduct post-merger. For example, the antitrust laws
do not prohibit a monopolist from raising prices. Thus, the merging
parties may later exercise market power by reducing innovation, quality
and services, and increasing prices, which may all go unchallenged.
Moreover, if and when, they review the industry post-merger, the
There is little
government agencies rarely post their findings.
the data they
about
agencies
federal
various
the
coordination among
collect on various industries. Also, there is not much coordination
between the legal staffs of the FTC and the Department of Justice, or
between the Department of Justice's criminal and civil antitrust
sections. While the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and statutes
on grand jury secrecy restrict the dissemination of certain
information, 3 15 the Department of Justice has not systemically studied,
for example, markets where criminal price-fixing occurred. Academic
3 16
literature relies on the bits of the published summaries of these cases.
But there have not been any extensive studies of the characteristics of
these industries, in which cartel behavior was prosecuted.
The legal staff and economists, in my experience, devote
considerable efforts in examining mergers, and are genuinely concerned
about reaching the right result. Consequently, if the benefits of such
post-merger review are so self-evident, why isn't the federal
government performing them? Several explanations come to mind.
First, the agencies may lack subpoena power for such post-merger
review. Data on net prices, costs, services, innovation and quality is not
always publicly available. Thus, it is unclear whether both agencies can
subpoena the firms post-merger for such information if they are not
investigating a possible antitrust violation. 3 17 A second explanation
315. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (explaining the secrecy requirements of grand jury proceedings).
316. See Gallo et al., supra note 110, at 97 n.30 (noting the inadequacies of economic
evidence regarding government criminal prosecutions).
317. The Antitrust Division appears to be more limited in conducting such general postmerger review. The Division's subpoena authority in civil investigations comes from the
Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311-1314 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006). The Act
defines an antitrust investigation to premerger activities or suspected antitrust violations. Id. at
§ 1311 (c). The FTC, on the other hand, has broader statutory authority to gather information on
the effects of its enforcement measures. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 46 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006),
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may be that with staffing and budgetary constraints, the antitrust
agencies may feel that resources are better used toward prosecuting
offenses, particularly if there is a higher value or reward in bringing
new cases than in revisiting old ones. 3 18 A final explanation is the bias
of "belief perseverance," which the behavioral economists describe as
clinging to a belief too tightly and for too long. 3 19 Under this bias,
individuals search for data that validates their opinion, and are reluctant
to search for evidence that contradicts their belief.320 When evidence
contradicts their firmly held opinion, they either discount it, or
misinterpret the evidence as actually supporting their hypothesis. Thus,
belief perseverance predicts that if people begin their antitrust careers
believing in the rational choice theories underlying the Merger
Guidelines, they may believe that their intellectual journey has come to
321
an end, even if compelling evidence to the contrary has emerged.
III. RECOMMENDATION
To encourage such post-merger review and to empirically test the
Merger Guidelines' predictive qualities, this article recommends five
legislative actions. Why legislation? Why can't the government
agencies simply condition approval of a merger on the parties'
compliance post-merger with these data requests? Short of legislation,
that would be a good start. But the merging companies may not always
faithfully comply (requiring the court to enforce a contractual obligation
for documents), some critical non-public industry data may be in the
hands of third parties (not subject to this contract), and the agencies'
reporting efforts would be sua sponte, rather than mandatory.
Consequently, the recommendations below serve as a starting point for
further discussion, and are by no means definitive.
First, Congress should expressly provide the federal antitrust
agencies with subpoena authority for non-public information to conduct
such post-merger review.
This subpoena authority should be
sufficiently broad to enable the antitrust agencies to test (and eliminate)
other explanations as to why competition (which includes important

amended by U.S. Safe Web Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-455 § 4(a), (b), (d), 120 Stat. 3372,
3373, 3375 (empowering FTC to gather data to perform economic studies).
318. GAO, REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS: CLOSER CONTROLS AND BETTER DATA COULD
IMPROVE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, supra note 211, at 12 (Antitrust Division noting that few
evaluative efforts undertaken because of lack of staff; FTC efforts stalled in part due to staff's
lack of time or inclination); Kovacic, supra note 309, at 852.
319. Barberis & Thaler, supra note 62, at 15.
320. Id.
321. Id. (using this analogy for Efficient Markets Hypothesis).
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3 22
parameters beyond price) increased or diminished post-merger.
Congress should also require the federal antitrust agencies to coordinate
with other agencies in sharing such information, subject to the data
producer's ability to challenge the dissemination of its commercially
sensitive information.
Second, Congress should require the federal antitrust agencies to
publish their summary findings of any merger subject to a Second
Request in which the agency: (i) took no enforcement action; (ii)
permitted the merger in part to be consummated pursuant to a consent
decree; or (iii) challenged the merger in court, but lost. The antitrust
agency (or other designated entity) two to five years after such mergers
were consummated would examine the state of competition in that
industry, including pricing levels and non-price components such as
innovation, productivity, services, and quality, to the extent observable.
Where the competition significantly diminished, the agencies would
report whether other variables, besides the merger, might explain the
increase in prices or reduction in innovation, productivity, services, and
quality. For those companies identified as potential entrants in the
original merger review, the reviewing agency would analyze, based on
its interviews with these identified entrants, why they chose not to enter,
of if they did enter, why they were ineffectual. The reviewing agency
would describe which, if any, of the merging parties' efficiencies it
could verify post-merger, the magnitude of the efficiencies, and the
extent that consumers directly benefited from such efficiencies. The
federal antitrust agencies would also describe annually what specific
actions, if any, they are undertaking with respect to this data, including
how they are incorporating the findings from this data in their merger
review.
Third, for any successful cartel or monopolization prosecution,
Congress should require the agency to report two to five years after the
completion of the prosecution the state of competition in that industry,
as described above. With criminal cartel prosecutions, the Department
of Justice typically seeks fines and incarceration; whether these
measures were sufficient to restore competition and deter recidivism
should be assessed.3 2 3 After securing its criminal convictions, the

322. If, on the other hand, the subpoena authority were narrowly constrained to post-merger
price data, one may fall into the trap of equating correlation with causation. Just because prices,

for example, increased post-merger does not necessarily mean that the merger caused prices to
increase. For example, prices may have increased in other geographic markets unaffected by the
merger.

323. As Senator Sherman observed:
These corporations do not care about your criminal statutes aimed at their servants.
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Department of Justice should also inquire, and publicly report, how
cartels with many members or competitors were able to collude. Did
they act as many profit-maximizer game theories would predict, or were
they more trustful and cooperative than these theories' predicted
outcome? If so, why? As the number of cartel members increases,
were there other specific factors that enabled them to successfully
collude? What, besides its amnesty program, can the government do to
deteriorate that trust and cooperation among price-fixers (without
adversely affecting other legal rules that foster socially beneficial
trustful relationships)? 324 The agencies should also determine whether
any cartel member or monopolist had acquired any competitor, large
customer or supplier in the affected industry in the five years before, or
at any time during, the alleged violation. If so, the agency should report
what action, if any, antitrust enforcers had taken in reviewing that
earlier acquisition, identify the reasons for not challenging it, and what
impact, if any, that earlier acquisition had on the industry's state of
competition.
Fourth, Congress should require the federal antitrust agencies to
make publicly available a computerized database identifying all civil
and criminal antitrust consent decrees, pleas, or litigated actions under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 325 The database should include certain
industry characteristics, such as: (i) the number of conspirators (and best
estimate of their market shares); (ii) the length of conspiracy; (iii) the
product or services market in which collusion occurred; (iv) the number
of competitors (and their market shares) who were not part of the
conspiracy; (v) the number of entrants (and their market shares) during
326
the period of the conspiracy; and (vi) the nature of the conspiracy.
They could give up at once one or two or three of their servants to bear this penalty for
them. But when you strike at their powers, at their franchises, at their corporate
existence, when you deal with them directly, then they begin to feel the power of the

Government.
21 CONG. REc. 2569 (1890).
324. The government's amnesty policy is cited as one helpful device to destroy that trust.
Under the Corporate Leniency (or Amnesty) Program, as revised in 1993, amnesty is automatic if
there is no pre-existing investigation, and may be available if the company cooperates after the
investigation is underway, and all officers, directors, and employees of a corporation qualifying
for automatic amnesty are protected from criminal prosecution. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATUS
REPORT: CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM 1 (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/criminal/8278.pdf. More information about the Department of Justice's leniency program
is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm.
325. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
326. The government may delay listing certain nonpublic information if it would compromise
ongoing antitrust enforcement. However, after completing its prosecution of the cartel, the
Division should post such information, absent demonstrating that disclosure would compromise

its enforcement activity.
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Fifth, any publicly held company that seeks to rely on an efficiency
defense before the agencies and/or the courts should be required to
publicly report its claimed efficiencies in its SEC filings. For each year
post-merger (for the period that it claims the efficiencies will be
realized), the company should report the actual amount of efficiencies
realized versus the projected amount. This should temper the company
executives from inflating the claimed efficiencies, and hold them
accountable to the shareholders for pursuing a growth-by-acquisition

strategy, while informing the agencies on those efficiencies for
particular industries that are more likely to be cognizable and
3 27
substantial.
IV.

BENEFITS AND RISKS OF EMPIRICALLY TESTING
THE MERGER GUIDELINES

The first benefit from such empirical testing is that the government
can assess the efficacy of the Merger Guidelines. No one currently
knows the government's success rate under these Guidelines. Thus,
such empirical testing hopefully will lead to more informed antitrust
enforcement, a nonpartisan goal palatable to those with divergent views
32 8
on antitrust enforcement.
Second, such empirical testing can provide the agencies, private bar,
courts, and antitrust policy makers greater confidence, and mitigate the

self-serving bias. The discussion of fairness so far assumes a deviation
from a uniformly accepted reference point.

A trickier issue is the

concept of fairness in ambiguous scenarios with competing reference
points. 329

A famous example is Sophocles's play Antigone, which

327. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, at § 4 (noting certain types of efficiencies
more likely to be cognizable and substantial). Several antitrust scholars have outlined the benefits
of verifying after the merger the parties' ex ante efficiency claims. Joseph F. Brodley, PostChicago Economics and Workable Legal Policy, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 683, 691-93 (1995); Robert
Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81
GEO. L.J. 195, 222-27 (1992) (proposing enforcement agencies' conditional clearance of certain
mergers subject to post-merger verification of efficiencies); Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N.
Dahdouh, Information Problems in Merger Decision Making and Their Impact on Development
of an Efficiencies Defense, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 26-27 (1993) (post-merger review of
efficiencies equivalent to performance bonding by merging parties verifying their assertion that
merger will realize efficiencies).
328. Posner, for one, would appear to support such post-merger review, as he noted in United
States v. Rockford Memorial Corp. that:
[i]t is regrettable that antitrust cases are decided on the basis of theoretical guesses as
to what particular market-structure characteristics portend for competition . . . We
would like to see more effort put into studying actual effect of concentration on price
in the hospital industry as in other industries.
United States v. Rockford Mem'I Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1286 (7th Cir. 1990).
329. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of
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3 30
represented "a collision between the two highest moral powers."
Although lacking the tragedy of the Greek play, merger review is not
beyond this self-serving bias. The government enforcers may view
themselves as defending consumers from the companies' rapacity. The
corporate executives may view the merger as necessary to survive for
the benefit of their shareholders and employees, or even society. Such
biases may engender costly discovery, contentious depositions, and
ultimately litigation. To mitigate this bias, the antitrust staff at the
Department of Justice typically outlines for the Assistant Attorney
General the merging parties' strongest arguments and documents, and
may engage in moot court arguments, where staff lawyers argue the
parties' positions. 3 3 1 But this post-merger review may provide another
tool to mitigate this self-serving bias. Human thinking is often context
dependent.332 For example, home buyers judge the fairness of a selling
price based on comparable deals in the neighborhood. So too, we may
be better equipped in evaluating a merger's anticompetitive impact
inductively (based on the outcome of prior comparable deals) than
deductively based on the market's deviation from a theoretical perfectly
competitive ideal. 33 3 In collecting post-merger data, the government
economists and legal staff can augment their analysis with a case-based
approach. By determining the pending merger's degree of similarity to
prior mergers, averaging the outcomes in these prior mergers weighted
by the similarity of these prior mergers to the pending one, the
government would have another measure to determine the probability of
a merger's anticompetitive outcome. 3 34 The merging firms would have
access to this database, and could augment their analysis of why the
merger would not likely raise anticompetitive concerns. Although each
side might have its list of comparables, this information may serve as
bridge for the parties as to why the merger is more likely to resemble
one set of outcomes than another.

Self-Serving Biases, in ADVANCES INBEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 326, 328 (Camerer ed., 2004).
330. Bernard Knox, Introduction to SOPHOCLES, THE THREE THEBAN PLAYS 41 (Robert
Fagles trans., Penguin 1984) (quoting Hegel). Antigone's moral authority for burying her brother
lies not only in her promise to him, but in honoring the divine "laws the gods hold in honor."
SOPHOCLES, THE THREE THEBAN PLAYS 63 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin 1984). Creon, on the
other hand, seeks to prevent the burial of this traitor who declared war on the city, and believes in
his moral superiority in upholding the safety of the country and the rule of law. Knox, supra, at
40-44.
331. Such measures have been shown to reduce this self-serving bias. See Babcock &
Loewenstein, supra note 329, at 332-33.
332. Id. at 339.
333. See BEINHOCKER, supra note 2, at 125-39 (describing humans as inductively rational
pattern recognizers).
334. Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 26, at 37.
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Third, such empirical testing may improve the agencies' credibility
with the courts. Currently, the parties in litigation each retain their
expert economists, typically academics with little, if any, regular
interaction or experience in the affected industry. Each party has its set
of customers who favor or oppose the merger, and company documents
that support or undermine the economic theory. The court then wades
through this conflicting evidence and ultimately decides which outcome
is more likely under the rational choice theory, premised on a profitmaximizer. 3 35 Not surprisingly, the predicted outcome may be divorced
from reality. Moreover, the Supreme Court has reconsidered its
decisions construing the Sherman Act when the theoretical
underpinnings of its earlier decisions were called into question. 336 This
empirical testing may assist the courts in refining or reconsidering the
theories underlying the antitrust laws.
Fourth, the federal agencies are ideally suited for collecting this
empirical data. Private parties rarely challenge mergers under section 7
of the Clayton Act. The federal agencies under the HSR provisions
initially receive the merger filings and largely spearhead the merger
reviews. They can also bear the cost of such empirical testing. As John
Stuart Mill observed, the government need not meddle in the affairs of
its citizens (either individually or collectively) when the citizens' affairs
do not prejudice others. 33 7 But one useful purpose of the government is
in "the greatest possible centralization of information, and diffusion of it
33 8
from the centre."
Fifth, such ex post assessments foster accountability. 3 39 The staff at
the agencies, in my experience, has been dedicated in enforcing the
antitrust laws. But after devoting long hours collecting data to evaluate
a merger's likely anticompetitiveness, the staff may conclude that the
data when evaluated under the lens of the Merger Guidelines' rational
choice theories is insufficient to reach any conclusion. Even if the staff

335. In Arch Coal, for example, the district court heard from more than twenty witnesses, and
received hundreds of exhibits and "well over 700 pages of post-hearing proposed findings of fact
and briefs." FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114 (D.D.C. 2001). In Sunguard, the
district court acknowledges its difficulties in defining the relevant market "given the conflicting
evidence from the parties' economists, as well as the conflicting customer statements submitted
by the parties." United States v. Sunguard Data Sys., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 190 (D.D.C.
2001).
336. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (in revisiting per se ban on vertical

restraints on maximum price, the Court describing its role "in recognizing and adapting to
changed
337.
338.
339.

circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience").
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 123 (Penguin Books ed. 2004).
Id.
Kovacic, supra note 309, at 847.
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believes that the merger may substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly, it may not recommend challenging the merger if
proving it in court would be too difficult. Even when the staff amasses
sufficient customer testimony, business records, admissions, and other
evidence to enjoin the transaction, the agency may ultimately not
challenge the merger for various reasons. One former Assistant
Attorney General declined to bring many cases that the Department of
Justice staff recommended because these cases did not make "economic
sense" or, in his opinion, were not in the public interest.340 On the other
hand, enforcement action may lead in some situations to undesirable
outcomes. In determining an acceptable settlement, the agency must
determine whether the divestiture of a particular brand, manufacturing
plant, or other assets would remedy the perceived harms. Such
divestitures may later prove to be inadequate. Alternatively, the agency
may require the merging parties to act or refraining from acting in such
a manner that unintentionally leads to anticompetitive results. 34 1 The
settlement itself may be misguided as foreseeable dynamic forces
indeed prevent the exercise of market power. By subjecting the
agencies' actions to external review and criticism, such ex post review
would bring some accountability to those at the agencies who are
3 42
responsible for enforcing the antitrust laws.
Sixth, publicly disseminating the agency's post-merger findings
improves transparency.
This information will assist the antitrust
community in determining where the Merger Guidelines are or are not
working, and enable other federal and state agencies, foreign
governments, and academics to further analyze and refine the economic
theories. Indeed, this empirical testing may reveal that many markets
are not closed equilibrium systems, but rather complex adaptive
systems. 343 Rather than focusing on price in a competitive equilibrium,
the antitrust agencies may instead focus on more important dynamic
factors, such as competitor restraints that thwart innovators from
entering and competing in that market. Public dissemination will also
further one purpose of the Guidelines by assisting business communities
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in predicting which mergers the government would likely investigate
344
and challenge.
Seventh, such empirical testing may assist policy makers in other
areas of the law. For example, if the lag in entry is attributable to the
lack of price transparency, then policy makers can assess how to
increase price transparency and foster entry. The government can also
redress other unintended actions, such as regulatory entry barriers,
which may foster anticompetitive effects.
Finally, and most importantly, such empirical research will inform
the public of antitrust's important role. Critics-ranging from the Wall
Street Journal opinion page to the Internet-can characterize a
particular antitrust enforcement as overzealous or flaccid. "The antitrust
problem," wrote Thurman Arnold over sixty years ago, "must be
brought to the public and not reserved for the abstract consideration of
the lawyer or the economist." 34 5 Some distrust the American public to
judge antitrust issues, fearing that the underlying economic theories are
too complex. But such paternalism is dangerous to our democratic
ideals. The public debate over the appropriate level of antitrust
enforcement will not be resolved by conflicting antitrust theories or by
conflated fears of either big business or big government. Rather, the
debate will be informed only by empirical research, namely what
happens to industries post-merger.
Against these benefits, one must weigh eight concerns. Several
concerns are significant and should caution policy makers to exercise
restraint in conducting this ex post review.
One concern is that the merging parties are already burdened with
complying with costly "Second Requests" during the merger process
under the HSR statute. 346 This supplemental review may further burden
the merging parties already saddled with compliance costs imposed by
foreign governmental, U.S. federal and state agencies. More significant
344. See Grimes, supra note 189, at 943 (discussing the benefits of increased transparency in

merger review).
345. Arnold, supra note 120, at 10.
346. For two private antitrust lawyers' perspective on the costs of the HSR process, see Joe
Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on Merger
Practice: A Case Study of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 885-89 (1997). To lessen this burden, the Federal Trade Commission and

the Department of Justice recently announced measures to further streamline the merger
investigation process and to reduce the cost, time, and burdens faced by the merging parties. Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Reforms to Merger Review Process (Feb. 16, 2006), available at
Department of Justice, Antitrust
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/02/mergerreviewprocess.pdf;
Division, Merger Review Process Initiative, (Revised Dec. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/220237.htm.
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than the costs from discovery, delay, and filing fees are the divestiture
costs. Few mergers are challenged today in court; instead, the
overwhelming majority are settled with a consent decree, whereby the
merging firms typically divest a brand, factory, or other assets. Some
may view these divestitures as the requisite sacrifice for government
approval. 34 7 If the costs of achieving the merger, however, exceed the
merger's gains to the parties, then the merger would not occur, and the
3 48
efficiencies that would flow from the merger would not be realized.
To mitigate this concern, several actions can be taken. First, the postmerger review should be limited primarily to the close-call mergers,
namely those subject to a Second Request. Thus, this ex post review
would impact a tiny percentage of all mergers. Between 1995 and
2004, the number of transactions reported annually under the HSR Act
ranged between 1,014 and 4,728, which itself is a subset of all mergers
in the United States. Of this, the federal antitrust agencies issued a
Second Request in less than five percent of the reported mergers
annually. 349 A second means of mitigation is, in revisiting the merger,
that the agency should request limited data that augments the cost, price,
quantity, and other data obtained pre-merger during the Second Request
process. Given that the staff generally has coordinated with the
merging parties pre-merger in obtaining this data, the parties can
minimize their costs by maintaining the data that the government will
later request. Third, and more importantly, in obtaining this data, the
government hopefully can refine its theories for particular industries,
thereby not only refining the scope of discovery for future merger
reviews, but also minimizing the risk of false positives (which require
costly divestitures in industries where past empirical data would cast
significant doubt on anticompetitive effects). The merging parties
would have another weapon to dissuade the government from issuing
Second Requests, namely, mergers in comparable markets, which did
not bear anticompetitive effects. If the agency acts irresponsibly in
issuing Second Requests, the private antitrust bar has additional

347.
348.
349.

Sims & Herman, supra note 346, at 887.
Coase, supra note 46, at 716.
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ammunition to lobby Congress to restrict corporations' pre-merger
burden under the HSR Act.
A second concern is the uncertainty this may engender for the
merging parties. Suppose that in revisiting the merger, the government
Should the
notices a significant non-cost-based price increase.
government now challenge the merger? How feasible would any
remedy be if the businesses were fully integrated? With the risk of
possible divestitures, might companies postpone investments in the
acquired assets? These serious questions illustrate the delicate balance
between the data collection's principal aim in refining the economic
theories, and preserving the government's legal right to challenge
mergers ex post. The agencies should not be automatically foreclosed
from challenging a merger ex post (as it is not foreclosed today), given
their obligation to protect consumers from anticompetitive practices.
On the other hand, the primary aim in securing this data should be to
test empirically the economic theories, not to challenge mergers. To
facilitate that end, economists or staff in a different section or different
agency, who would not be biased toward a likely prosecution, could
collect the post-merger data.
The third concern is biased results. The merging parties, knowing
that the government will revisit them, might refrain during this two to
five-year period from raising prices or otherwise reducing competition,
while other merging companies not subject to a Second Request would
raise prices where they could. To minimize this bias, the government
could randomly (depending on staff workload) revisit a small number of
other mergers not subject to a Second Request (but for which an
investigation was opened), and examine these as well. Moreover,
customers can be given the telephone number of the post-merger review
staff, to report any anticompetitive effects post-merger.
Another potential bias is that the empirical data will cover only those
mergers subject to a Second Request. Thus the data will not capture a
cross-section of mergers, but only those in highly concentrated
industries, with high entry barriers. But this is as good a place to start
as any. The data from the criminal prosecutions will assist in analyzing
other markets where collusion occurred. In addition, the agencies, as
this article proposes, should randomly select other mergers that the staff
investigated but declined issuing a Second Request. By informing
antitrust prosecution, the data hopefully will steer the agencies toward
industries where mergers are more likely to be problematic, and thus
deserve attention, while avoiding other industries (that are superficially
appealing under the Merger Guidelines) where mergers are unlikely to
produce anticompetitive results.
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A fourth concern is waste-if the empirical data confirms that the
current economic model accurately predicts the outcome (including the
likely magnitude of anti- or pro-competitive effects), would the
empirical testing have been for naught? Even the staunchest defenders
of the Merger Guidelines (or any economic model) should invite the
world to test their theory's accuracy in predicting outcomes. If the
Guidelines withstand scrutiny, then the antitrust policy makers' and
courts' confidence in them increases. It is the government's obligation
to ascertain the efficacy of its actions.
No one should be content that because these economic theories,
including the assumptions underlying them, have been used for the past
two decades without apparent destruction to the economy, then they
must be good. The antitrust laws were vigorously enforced before the
Chicago School's theories came into favor. Grotesque distortions to the
economy did not occur after World War II under these earlier antitrust
policies (such as preserving small businesses). Such distortions, if any,
would likely manifest themselves in particular industries and may be
one of many factors contributing to the industry's sickly competitive
state. Consequently, no group should unilaterally decide ex ante that its
theories are beyond judgment. To assume that its economic theories are
accurate predictors and that empirical testing would be wasteful is to
assume infallibility.
A fifth concern is that the fault may not lie in the Guidelines, but in
the attorneys and economists applying the Guidelines, who are thus
responsible for the false positives/negatives. Empirical testing should
reveal if the errors are systematic or episodic. If the latter, then the
testing may provide some accountability (for example, reassigning
administration officials, lawyers or economists). But if errors occur
throughout the government agencies, then that raises concerns with the
Guidelines. The Guidelines may indeed represent the Platonic ideal, but
if difficult to apply, it would be helpful to understand under what
circumstances.
A sixth concern arises if empirical testing shows that the Merger
Guidelines were poor predictors in certain circumstances. Critics may
argue that absent these theories, the antitrust policy makers would revert
to normative, rudderless enforcement policies of the 1950s, 60s, and
70s. Behavioral economics is residual, as it describes phenomena that
the profit-maximizer model does not explain. 3 50 It cannot predict,
critics argue; thus, the profit-maximizing theories are the best we have,
until a better predictive model comes along. This criticism, however, is
350. Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 18, at 1559-60.
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a plea for ignorance. One cannot assess the reliability of the Merger
Guidelines without empirically testing their predictive value. Perhaps,
the Guidelines can be tailored to rectify these mistakes. But if the
Guidelines are a poor predictor, then antitrust policy makers must make
an informed decision of whether these Guidelines in their current form
are worth using for every merger.
No doubt, the Guidelines'
transparency assists the parties in predicting which mergers the
government will likely investigate. Such empirical testing will increase
transparency. But more importantly, just as the rational choice theories
premised on stable preferences have come under attack as the
complexity of human behavior is fully realized, so too may the simple
uniform assumptions underlying the Merger Guidelines be unrealistic.
Instead of being a concern, this represents an opportunity to revise the
Guidelines so as to more accurately depict (and predict) behavior for
each industry. In better understanding the complexities of a dynamic
marketplace, we may ultimately accept our shortcomings in accurately
forecasting anticompetitive effects. But at least we would have a better
grasp of reality, and dealing with its hazards.
A seventh concern is that the empirical testing addresses false
negatives, but not false positives, namely instances where the
government erroneously challenged an otherwise pro-competitive
merger. The government challenges few mergers. For example,
between 1994 and 2005 the Department of Justice challenged annually
less than 1.5% of all mergers. 3 5 1 The extent to which this chills other
mergers from occurring is unknown. (If significant, one would expect
merger activity to be positively correlated to administrations with lax
antitrust enforcement.) But the aim here is more informed antitrust
enforcement, not simply increasing the number of mergers challenged
annually. Moreover, in determining that a close-call merger did not
lead to anticompetitive results, the agency may have greater confidence
in permitting mergers in similar industries, knowing that they can test
these assumptions. Undoubtedly, there is always the concern that the
pending merger will lead to a different outcome, but the agencies at
least will have an extensive factual mosaic of other mergers where,
under similar circumstances, no antitrust concerns arose post-merger.
The staff and parties could seek to differentiate the facts of those

35 1. The total number of mergers challenged in part or in whole. The Department of Justice
challenged 22 (0.96%) in 1994; 18 (0.64%) in 1995; 30 (0.97%) in 1996; 31 (0.84%) in 1997; 51
(1.08%) in 1998; 46 (0.99%) in 1999; 48 (0.97%) in 2000; 32 (1.35%) in 2001; 10 (0.84%) in
2002; 15 (1.48%) in 2003; 9 (0.6%) in 2004: and 4 (0.2%) in 2005. ANTITRUST DIV. WORKLOAD
STATISTICS, supra note 16.
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industries from that instant merger, but at least an empirical baseline
would exist.
An eighth concern is that this diverts the government's legal staff and
economists from prosecuting antitrust violations. The agencies cannot
prosecute every antitrust offense, and devoting resources to this
retrospective may sacrifice investigating other violations. This may be
a concern, but currently the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division
attorneys are devoting resources to defend immigration prosecutions
before the various federal courts of appeals. Moreover, the resources
for such post-merger review should not be as significant as the initial
merger review. But as part of their budget, the agencies should receive
funds earmarked for this review.
CONCLUSION

Antitrust merger policies are currently long on theory and short on
empirical testing. No one knows how accurately the Merger Guidelines
predict whether, and to what extent, mergers across industries lessen
competition or tend to create monopolies. Application of the Merger
Guidelines conceivably could lead at times to false negatives (for
example, predicting prices post-merger to decline or remain stable, or
predicting entry to discipline a price hike) or, at other times, to false
positives (such as predicting a price increase when none occurs). While
typically spending months reviewing mergers ex ante, the federal
antitrust agencies infrequently, if ever, revisit these industries postmerger to see what actually happened to the state of competition. Given
the developments in behavioral economics, and the anomalies between
the Merger Guidelines and criminal price-fixing prosecutions, there are
now even more compelling reasons for engaging in such post-merger
inquiry.
As Coase said, "[a]n inspired theoretician might do as well without
such empirical work, but my own feeling is that the inspiration is most
likely to come through the stimulus provided by the patterns, puzzles,
and anomalies revealed by the systematic gathering of data, particularly
352
when the prime need is to break our existing habits of thought.
Antitrust is presently at that exciting threshold.
The federal
government, ideally suited to review these industries post-merger, can
offer the public data that may lead to a better understanding of when,
and why, certain mergers may substantially lessen competition. It must
now resist the slumber of decided opinion, and undertake this journey.

352. Coase, supra note 46, at 718-19.

